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Michael Jensen, M.D., respectfully submits his Corrected Brief of Appellee/CrossAppellant's Brief. The statement of jurisdiction, the issues presented for review, the applicable
constitutional rules, statutes, etc. and statements of the case are combined. Only the argument
responding to the Appellants' brief and the cross-appeal argument are separately identified.
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a judgment entered after a jury verdict
and the cross-appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A Whether the judgment should be affirmed on: (1) whether the Media Defendants'
broadcasts focused only on Dr. Jensen's professional duties; (2) whether the statements were
substantially true; (3) whether Dr. Jensen sustained economic damages; and (4) whether there
was clear and convincing evidence of malice; each requiring a marshaling of the evidence and
a demonstration of insufficiency. Crvokstonv Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
B. Whether this Court should review a pretrial denial of summary judgment after an
adverse trial judgment. This is an issue of law and inherently can only be raised in this Court.
C Whether the district court correctly declined to apply the defamation one-year statute
of limitations to false light invasion of privacy claims. The Appellants identified where this issue
was presented below. This is an issue of law determined by Ccoc v Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah
1988), which ruled that defamation and invasion of privacy are separate and distinct torts
affecting separate and different interests.
D. Whether a physician has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to be secretly
videotaped in his examination room when all of the physicians who testified on the subject said
1

that Dr. Jensen should have an expectation of privacy. This issue was raised in & 2741; 295164; 5701; 5720-24; 5968 and 6042-50. This is an issue of fact resolved by the jury Crxxkston v
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
E. Whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the Media Defendants' false posing
as a patient, installing a hidden video camera in the doctor's examination room, and using
selected tape bites to deceptively portray a physician as one offering illegal drugs and comparing
this to physicians who rape or kill their patients, was highly offensive. This issue was preserved
by the Special Verdict. The trial court makes the threshold determination of offensiveness
followed by the jury resolving the question of fact. The verdict is not overturned if there is
evidence supporting the jury's verdict. SeeStienvMarriot Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374 (Utah
Ct.App. 1997).
F. Whether Media Defendants trespassed and intended to subject Dr. Jensen to
eavesdropping or surveillance under § 76-9-402(1)(a), when the reporter falsely represented
herself as "a patient needing to lose weight to keep her job" and took a hidden camera into the
examination room to do a prescripted story? ("Story idea", App. 1) This issue is created by the
verdict. Whether a trespass occurred is a factual issue. Steelev Breinhdt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah Q.
App. 1987). A challenge requires a marshaling of evidence and demonstration of insufficiency.
Crxxkston v Fire. Ins. Exch.y 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
G. Whether the Media Defendants installed "any device for... recording" when without
anyone's consent, they installed a hidden videotape camera in Dr. Jensen's examination room?
UCA Section 76-9-402 suggests this is a question of fact.
H. Whether any of the Media Defendants' broadcasts placed Dr. Jensen in a false light?
2

This issue is created by the juiy s verdict. A challenge requires a marshaling of evidence and a
demonstration of insufficiency. Crvokstonv Fire Ins. Exd).y 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
I. Whether a reasonable jury could find that the media's three Dr. Jensen stories were
each false? This issue was preserved by the Special Verdict and is a factual question requiring
the Appellant to marshal the evidence and demonstrate insufficiency. See Cvookston v Fire Ins.
Exd>., 817 P.2d 789,799 (Utah 1991).
J. Whether a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Jensen suffered economic loss caused
by the Media Defendants' three stories? This is a factual jury issue not to be set aside unless a
marshaling of the evidence and demonstration of insufficiency clearly shows the jury's finding
was erroneous. SeeMassonv New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Fitz v Synthes (USA)
1999 UT103,990 P.2d 391; Crvokstonv Fire Ins. Exdo., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
K. Whether a reasonable jury could find malice, warranting punitive damages? This issue
was preserved by the Special Verdict. Whether malice exists is a jury question reviewable under
the clearly erroneous standard. See Nash v Craigjo, Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1978).
L. Whether the jury's awards on the common-law intrusion was an invasion of privacy
claim and whether, the § 76-9-402(1) (a) claim and the § 76-9-402(1) (b) claim were duplicative
warranting a two-thirds reduction? This issue was raised by the Appellant's Motion for New
Trial and to Alter or Amend the Judgment [K 5960], and is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. SeeSteenUik v Luhfidd, 906 P.2d 872, 881 (Utah 1995).
M. Whether the misconduct in gathering information claims relate to the misconduct in
broadcasting information claims so that Dr. Jensen should be awarded an attorney's fee incurred
for all of his claims? This issue was raised in the motion for attorney's fees proceedings [R.
3

6872]. The iss ue of whether attorney s fees should be awarded on a particular claim is a question
of law reviewed for correctness. SeeKathJor^nsenSylnc. v OgknCityMallCay 2001 UTApp 128,
111.
N. Whether Dr. Jensen should have been awarded "necessary disbursements" for expert
witness fees, out-of-pocket costs and deposition transcripts? This issue was raised in a motion
to enter a judgment for costs and necessary disbursements. [R 6215.] It requires an
interpretation of Rule 54, which is reviewed for correctness. See Carrier v Pro TechRestomtion, 944
P.2d 346 (Utah 1997).
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC
In addition to the Media Defendants' citations, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-403 and 76-9406, Rule 54(d) Utah Rules of Civ. Proa; Utah Const. Art. VIII Section 4; Utah Administrative
Code R 156-37-3 are determinative.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case -- Course of Proceedings -- Lower Court Disposition

United Television Inc. ("KTVX") and its former reporter Mary Sawyers (collectively
referred to as "Media Defendants") appealed a Judgment entered by Judge Ray Harding, Jr. in
the 4th Judicial District, Civil No. 970400512CV, after a month-long trial with a jury verdict in
favor of Dr. Jensen on his defamation, invasion of privacy and intentional interference with
prospective economic relations claims. The jury also awarded punitive damages.
Dr. Jensen is cross-appealing a reduction of a portion of the verdict as duplicative; a
denial of attorney s fees incurred on defamation and false light claims and for work performed

4

by attorney Wesley Sine; and a denial of necessary disbursements as costs.1
B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
1. Dispositive Facts

a. Prior to the three broadcasts at issue2, Dr. Jensen was a general practitioner practicing
at FirstMed Clinic and also at the Springville Utah Family Clinic. He has since been reduced to
practicing medicine in nursing homes.3 At no time did the Media Defendants contend that Dr.
Jensen was a public official or public figure.
b. United Television owned and operated Channel 4, KTVX. Mary Sawyers ("Ms.
Sawyers") was a KTVX reporter. [K 6864 (Sawyers) at 109; R. 6861 (Kimball) at 13.]
c. After a month-long trial, 112 exhibits, and 39 witnesses, the jury entered a verdict in
Dr. Jensen's favor on his defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional interference with
prospective economic relations claims.
d. By use of a special verdict, the jury found that a Nov. 6,1996 broadcast defamed Dr.
Jensen or placed him in a false light. The Media Defendants did not marshal the evidence
supporting the jury verdict. Dr. Jensen does not intend to take on their burden, but lists some
of the facts supporting the verdict: Ms. Sawyers falsely stated: "Dr. Michael Jensen - He's the
one we caught on tape promising me illegal drugs." [PL's Ex. 21.] What Dr. Jensen said was "if
Fastin didn't work for you, I would be willing to work with you uh mxjbe using Dexedrine."

*Dr. Jensen is aware that expert witness fees are almost always not taxed as costs, but
believes that this case presents an ideal situation for modifying or reversing the existing law.
2

The trial exhibit tape of the three broadcasts is attached as App. 2.

3

In the pecking order of medical practice, practicing in nursing homes is the least
desirable. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 102.]
5

[Def.'s Ex. 99 at 2 (emphasis added).] Prior to any broadcast, he also corrected himself. He said
he had done some additional research and could not now prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss.
The Media Defendants' witness, Dr. Van Komen, testified that Dexedrine is not an illegal drug.
[R 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.] The story also represented that Dr. Jensen passed out drugs to
addicts and killed a patient. [PL's Ex. 21.] It placed Dr. Jensen in the same false light categories
as physicians who perform illegal abortions, disfigure patients, pass out drugs to drug addicts,
sexually abuse patients, and kill patients with lethal injections. [PL's Ex. 21.]
e. The jury awarded pecuniary losses of $1 million and general damages of $500,000.
The Media Defendants did not marshal the evidence. Some supportive facts are: Economist
Dr. Frank Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniarylosses were $1,595,783.00 to $2,195,094.00.
[R. 6850 (Stuart) at 69 &Pl.'s Ex. 210.] CPADean Smith testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniaiy
losses were $1,022,600.00 to $2,179,800.00. [K 6850 (Smith) at 175 &Pl/s Ex. 211.] Dr. Jensen
testified that he was emotionally damaged. [R 6866 Qensen) at 118-19.] He stated he felt like
"the rotten egg." He testified he was treated differently by his patients. A patient left after
learning Dr. Jensen was the treating physician. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 42-45.] Dr. Jensen testified
he was ridiculed. A pharmacist refused to fill a prescription because he thought that Dr. Jensen
had lost his medical license. [K 6856 Qensen) at 28.] He can no longer work in a family
practice. Hospital privileges have been permanently lost. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28-29 and &
6866 (Jensen) at 63-66.] Dr. Rosen testified that after the November 6, 1996 broadcast, Dr.
Jensen was distraught and hurt. [K 6848 (Rosen) at 90-91.]
f. The jury also found the Media Defendants' September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996
broadcasts placed Dr. Jensen in a false light, and awarded $600,000 in pecuniary loss, and
6

$100,000 in general damages. Again, the Media Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence
supporting this portion of the verdict. Some of the supporting fact areas follow: 1) Dr. Frank
Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniary losses were $1,595,783.00 to $2,195,094.00. [R 6850
(Stuart) at 56-57, 69 & PL's Exs. 209 & 210.]; 2) Dean Smith, CPA, testified that Dr. Jensen's
pecuniary losses were $1,022,600.00 to $2,179,800.00. [R 6850 (Smith) at 172,175 &Pl.'s Ex.
211.]; and 3) Dr. Jensen testified that he was mentally hurt after the first two broadcasts. [K
6866 (Jensen) at 118-19.] Dr. Jensen testified he was fired the day after the first broadcast and
intensely investigated for eight months which gready disrupted his life. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 27.]
Dr. Jensen testified he still suffers ridicule from the two broadcasts. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28.]
Dr. Jensen testified that he was removed from IHC insurance privileges, and he can no longer
work in a family practice. His hospital privileges have been taken away. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 2829 and R 6866 (Jensen) at 63-66.]
g. The jury also found an intrusion upon Dr. Jensen's seclusion and awarded general
damages of $50,000. Some supporting facts are: Dr. Jensen testified the Media Defendants
entered into his examination room with a hidden camera. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 55.] Dr. Rosen
testified that the examination room is a "private place" for physicians. [R 6848 (Rosen) at 89.]
Dr. Badger testified that he would not allow a hidden camera in an examination room because
it invades a physician's privacy. [K 6869 (Badger) at 21.] Dr. Purser and Dr. Canfield each
testified that the examination room is a private place for physicians. [R 6869 (Purser) at 127;
R 6869 (Ginfield) at 181-82.] Physicians also testified that secret videotaping in an examination
room was highly offensive. [K 6869 (Canfield) at 181.]
h. The jury found that KTVX violated § 76-9-402(1) (a), which prohibits anyone from
7

trespassing4 with the intent to subjea anyone to eavesdropping or surveillance in a private place,
and awarded general damages of $50,000. The Media Defendants did not marshal the facts.
Some facts supporting the verdict are: The video showed the jurors how Ms. Sawyers falsely
posed as a patient and recorded her trespass into the examination room. [PL's Ex. 33.] AH
physicians who testified on the subjea said the examination room is a private place for
physicians. Sa?para. g above. Ms. Sawyers testified that she did not receive permission to video
Dr. Jensen or use a hidden camera. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 57.]
i. Next, the jury found that the Media Defendants violated § 76-9-402(l)(b), which
prohibits the installation of any device for observing, photographing, or recording, without
consent. Some facts supporting the verdict are: The video showed how Ms. Sawyers falsely
posed as a patient and recorded her visit in Dr. Jensen's examination room without permission.
The video shows how Ms. Sawyers concealed her hidden camera in a day planner and installed
it in the examination room. [PL's Ex. 33.] Both Ms. Sawyers and Dr. Jensen testified that he
did not consent to the secret videotaping. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 57.]
j. The jury found that the Media Defendants interfered with Dr. Jensen's prospective
economic relations and awarded $25,000 in general damages. Some facts supporting the verdict
are: Dr. Jensen testified he is treated differently by his patients. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 42-45.] He
testified he cannot work in a family practice because without IHC coverage, most patients will
not see him. His hospital privileges were taken away. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28-29 and R 6866
(Jensen) at 63-66.] Dr. Jensen has been reduced to seeing patients in nursing homes, the last

4

If consent to come on the premises is falsely induced, a trespass occurs. See State v.
Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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place a physician would want to work [K 6866 Qensen) at 102.]
k The jury also found that the Media Defendants' misconduct justified an award of
punitive damages in conformity with § 78-18-1 etseq. The Media Defendants do not marshal
the evidence. Some supporting facts are identified in para. "1" below.
1. The jury awarded punitive damages of $450,600 stemming from the November 6,1996
broadcast; $245,300 from the September 5th and June 17th broadcasts; $40,000 in punitive
damages on the common law intrusion claim, and $40,000 each on the two statutory privacy
violations of §§ 76-9-402(1)(a) and 76-9-402(1)(b). Finally, the jury awarded $25,000 for
KTVX's intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Some supporting facts
are: [t]he Media Defendants always intended to do a sensational story ("Story idea," App. 1); Ms.
Sawyers repeatedly and falsely posed as a patient needing diet drugs to keep her job. She
repeatedly tried to persuade Dr. Jensen to prescribe drugs over the phone knowing it was
wrongful.5 During the first broadcast Ms. Sawyers states that Dr. Jensen never asked if she had
high blood pressure or diabetes. However, Dr. Jensen's assistant took Ms. Sawyers blood
pressure, and Dr. Jensen had Ms. Sawyer's blood pressure test results at the time he gave Ms.
Sawyers the prescription. [R 6865 Qensen) at 125-26; & 6866 (Jensen) at 56.] Dr. Jensen
testified he asked Ms. Sawyers if she had diabetes. [K 6866 0ensen) at 56.] Further, diabetes
is not a contraindication to taking diet pills. [R. 6866 Qensen) at 56.] Ms. Sawyers fakely
reported that Dr. Jensen promised her Dexedrine an illegal drug, but Dr. Jensen said "maybe"
and, before any broadcast, later explained that when he said Dexedrine was technically illegal to
use as a diet pill, he meant that the rules and regulations discouraged using a Schedule II
5

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii).
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substance. Consequendy, he informed Ms. Sawyers that he would not prescribe Dexedrine. [&
6865-6866 (Jensen) at 116.] Dr. Hirsche testified that a doctor may vary the way medicine is
used for the good of a patient and that he did not consider Dr. Jensen to be suggesting a false
diagnosis to Ms. Sawyers. [K 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] On June 17,1996, the Media Defendants
aired the second broadcast. [PL's Ex. 20.] They falsely represented that Dr. Jensen gave Ms.
Sawyers a prescription without following state law. They reported: 1) the physician must
determine that the patient made a good-faith effort to lose weight; 2) the physician must perform
a physical examination; and 3) the physician must rule out the existence of health conditions that
would be aggravated by the drug. Ms. Sawyers stated Dr. Jensen did none of these. But Dr.
Jensen did determine Ms. Sawyers made a good-faith effort to lose weight. He had her medical
history, asked questions, and knew her blood pressure. He was not able to finish the
examination only because she abruptly left before the examination was completed. Finally, Dr.
Jensen did rule out any contraindications. [K 6866 Qensen) at 139; 192; & 6865 (Jensen) at 85;
130-31.] Ms. Sawyers reported that the State said Dr. Jensen broke the law a second time when
he made the Dexedrine statement. Dr. Jensen's statement, however, was not illegal. [R. 6865
Qensen) at 116; & 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] Further, the State was never after his license. [K 6857
(Allred) at 99.] On November 6,1996, the Media Defendants did their third broadcast. [PL's
Ex. 21.] Using earlier excerpts, they placed Dr. Jensen in the same category as physicians who:
performed illegal abortions; disfigured patients; sexually abused patients; passed out drugs to
drug addicts; or killed patients with lethal injections. [PL's Ex. 21.] Further, Ms. Sawyers stated*
"Dr. Michael Jensen - He's the one we caught on tape promising me illegal drugs." [PL's Ex.
21.] DOPL Qiairman Dr. Van Komen testified that Dexedrine is not an illegal drug. Rather
10

"illegal drugs are Scheduled 1, such as cocaine and marijuana." [K 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.]
m. Later the district court ruled the jury's awards under §§ 76-9-402(1) (a) and 76-9402(l)(b) and the common law intrusion claim were duplicative and reduced them bytwo-thirds,
n The district court also declined to award attorney's fees for work performed on the
broadcast claims and for work performed by attorney Wesley Sine.
o. The Court declined to award necessary disbursements which included the following
expert witness costs:
1)

BYU Communications Professor Alfred D. Pratte, in the amount of

$4,667.50. The trial court allowed only $18.50. Professor Pratte testified the Media Defendants
did not comply with journalism standards.
2)

Editor of the "Journal of Mass Media Ethics," Dr. Ralph Barney, in the

amount of $1,989.65. The trial court allowed only $18.50. He testified that the Media
Defendants did not conduct the kind of journalism investigation and analysis that would justify
using a hidden camera.
3)

Prominent Utah County Physician, Dr. Blaine Hirsche (now deceased), in

the amount of $1,500.00. The trial court allowed only $26.60 as a witness and service fee. He
testified that Dr. Jensen met the community standard of medical care. He also testified how
physicians view and abide by DOPL prescription regulations.
4)

Physician Dr. Michael Rosen, in the amount of $9,790.00. The trial court

did not allow any of Dr. Rosen's costs. Dr. Rosen testified that Dr. Jensen met the standard of
care for general practitioners in the medical community.
5)

CPA Dean Smith, in the amount of $13,725.00. The trial court allowed
11

only $67.50 of Mr. Smith's costs. Mr. Smith testified and described Dr. Jensen's pecuniary
losses.
6)

Economist, Dr. FrankStuart, in the amount of $26,129.66. The trial court

allowed only $67.50. He testified about the reduction of Dr. Jensen's income and losses.
p. The parties timely filed their notice of appeal and notice of cross-appeal.
2. Response to the Media Defendants' Statement of Facts
The foregoing are the dispositive facts relevant to the issues presented for review. The
problems with the Media Defendants' Statement of Facts are first, instead of marshaling the
facts in support of the verdict, they seek to retry their case on appeal. See South Central Utah v
A uditingDvu, 951 P.2d 218,226 (Utah 1997). Second, many of the facts are not relevant to the
issues for review. Third, many of the "factual" allegations are actually argument. Fourth, each
allegation is not numbered, making it difficult to respond. Nevertheless, to weed out what is and
is not a statement of fact relevant to an issue for review, Dr. Jensen responds as follows:
a. The heading on page 8 is not a statement of fact. It is legal argument. What occurred
at the party was not a part of the claims at issue. Most importantly, they omit and misconstrue
facts as follows: Lisa Johnson was romantically involved with KTVX's managing editor, Roth.
[R 6849 (Roth) at 103.] Mr. Roth authored the "Story idea". See App. 1. Then Ms. Johnson
told Dr. Jensen that as a "Deseret Nem" food critic, she was required to frequently eat out. [R
6865 (Jensen) at 82; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 57.] Ms. Johnson said she was exercising and asked
about weight-reducing options. [R. 6865 (Jensen) at 82; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 57.] Dr. Jensen
responded with different options including prescriptions. [K 6865 (Jensen) at 83; & 6845
(Johnson) at 57.] The assertion that Ms. Johnson was not interested in using diet pills is contrary
12

to the evidence believed by the jury Dr. Jensen testified Ms. Johnson asked him for diet pills.
[R 6865 Qensen) at 82-83.] Only after he informed her of the contraindications did she say she
would not be taking medication. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 82-83 & 107; R 6845 Qohnson) at 59.]
Contrary to the statement that "Ms. Johnson had never been a patient of Dr. Jensen's", the
evidence at trial was she could be considered his patient. [R 6866 Qensen) at 126-28.] The
Media Defendants misstate that before "prescribing Fastin, Dr. Jensen did not conduct any
physical examination of Ms. Johnson/' Appellants' Brief at 8. At trial, however, there was
testimony that Dr. Jensen complied with the community's standard of medical care. [R 6848
(Rosen) at 105; R 6871 (Hirsche) at 109.] Dr. Jensen asked whether she was on medications,
and asked questions about her general health. He also knew her exercise routine indicated that
her general health was good. [R 6865 Qensen) at 85-86; R 6866 Qensen) 129-130.] The Media
Defendants misstate "... nor did he [Dr. Jensen] 'determine[ ] . . . through review of the records
of prior treatment... that Qohnson] ha[d] made a substantial, good faith effort to lose weight
in a treatment program... without the utilization of controlled substances.'" Appellants' Brief
at 8. Prior to prescribing Fastin, Dr. Jensen determined that Ms. Johnson made a good faith
effort to lose weight. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 139.] Further, Dr. Jensen asked her to come to his
clinic for monitoring and treatment. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 88.] Later, Ms. Johnson told Dr.
Jensen that she would not use the prescription. [R 6856 Qensen) at 14; R 6845 (Johnson) at
59.] The Media Defendants misstate "Dr. Jensen did not determine whether there were
contraindications to the use of Fastin." Appellants' Brief at 9. Dr. Jensen testified he told Ms.
Johnson about the contraindications of Fastin. [R 6865 Qensen) at 85.] The Media Defendants
state "[i]n fact, Ms. Johnson has a heart condition that could have been seriously aggravated if
13

she took the amphetamine Dr. Jensen prescribed." Appellants' Brief at 9. That is probably why
after Dr. Jensen explained the contraindications of Fastin to her, she told him that she would
not fill the prescription. Media Defendants misstate "[i]t is undisputed that Dr. Jensen's
prescribing of Fastin to Ms. Johnson was in violation of Utah Admin. Code R156-37-ll(14)»"
Reg 156-37-3 reads that "nothing in these rules is intended to impose any limitations on a
physician . . . to administer or dispense controlled substances in accordance with generally
accepted medical practice."6 Physicians testified that Dr. Jensen's conduct met the medical
standard of care and the jury believed them. [R 6848 (Rosen) at 105; R 6871 (Hirsche) at 109.]
b. The heading on p. 9 is factually wrong. Media experts testified that the claimed
investigation was deficient. [R 6848 (Pratte) at 177-78.]
c. Mr. Roth did more than discuss the social event with his news director.

¥k

recommended that Ms. Sawyers falsely pose as a patient, and try to trick Dr. Jensen into
prescribing diet drugs. [R 6849 (Roth) at 117.]
d. Ms. Sawyers did not call to discuss diet pills. She called to falsely portray herself as
a patient and to wrongfully persuade him to prescribe drugs. When Dr. Jensen refused, she
avoided an appointment, and again asked for drugs. [R 6865 0ensen) at 119; R 6866 at 24; R
6868 (Scott) at 71-75,79-80]. Further, she first spoke with Dr. Jensen's office manager, Laurie
Scott ("Scott"), who relayed the following information: Ms. Sawyers said she wanted him to
prescribe diet pills over the phone. She said she needed to lose 5 pounds before her next stoiy
because "it's a dog-eat-dog world out there" and she was receiving management pressure to lose
weight or lose her job. Ms. Sawyers said she wanted Dr. Jensen to prescribe pills immediately
6

The court ruled that the regulations were guidelines, not law [R 1016,1021-22].
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and that she was too busy and tired to go to Utah County. She also said the overweight people
get the "crappy shifts" on TV and that is why Shelly Osterloh never had prime time coverage.
[R 6868 (Scott) at 72-75.] Dr. Jensen believed that Ms. Sawyers was about to lose her job
because of her weight. [R 6865 (}ensen) at 119.]
e. Heading No. 3 and the paragraph thereafter are wrong. The truth was that when the
Media Defendants' scheme to trick Dr. Jensen into prescribing drugs over the phone failed, they
decided to have Ms. Sawyers again falsely pose as a patient, secredy videotape him, and persuade
him to prescribe diet drugs. [R 6849 (Roth) at 117.]
f. The description of what occurred at the First Med Clinic is wrong. Dr. Jensen's
examination of Ms. Sawyers included, but was not limited to the following: A comprehensive
medical history was taken; blood pressure, pulse and respiration were charted by Dr. Jensen's
staff and reviewed by him - he wrote on the chart that Ms. Sawyers had no medical problems
[R 6865 Qensen) at 125-26.]; a determination was made that Ms. Sawyers was not on any
medication and was not allergic to drugs [R 6866 (Jensen) at 189; R 6865 at 128.]; her age and
gender were noted [R 6865 (Jensen) at 127-28.]; her eyes, coloring, hands and feet appeared
normal. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 186,193.] SeeApp. 3. After considering the medical information,
conducting a lengthy interview, and noting Ms. Sawyers' expressed desire to lose weight to save
her job, he prescribed Fastin and Pondimin and continued his examination. [R 6865 (Jensen)
at 126-30; Defs.' Ex. 77A; R 6847 (Sawyers) at 100.] Deceitfully, as Dr. Jensen was about to
complete his work (including weighing Ms. Sawyers and listening to her heart), she abruptly
exited the examination room. She had what she wanted. [R 6865 0ensen) at 130-31; R 6866
(Jensen) at 192 Ins. 17-19.] Dr. Jensen testified he asked Ms. Sawyers if she had diabetes. [R
15

6866 (Jensen) at 56.] Also, diabetes is not a contraindication to diet pills. [R 6866 Qensen) at
56.]
g. Media Defendants' misstate that Ms. Sawyers was not overweight, implying that Dr.
Jensen should not have prescribed Phen-Fen. Appellants' Brief at 12. Physicians testified that
Dr. Jensen was within the standard of care in prescribing diet pills. [R 6871 (Hirsche) at 109;
R 6848 (Rosen) at 105.] Further, after viewing the tape, Dr. Purser stated doctors look at the
patient's body habitis and size. He said: "if you look at that video, you can see that her derriere
hangs out over the sides of the chair," implying that she looked large enough for him to
prescribe diet medication. [R 6869 (Purser) at 102.]
h. On page 12 of the Media Defendants' Brief, they quote a portion of the hidden
camera transcript. Gting this exchange is misleading and demonstrates the Media Defendants'
failure to marshal the facts. Dr. Jensen testified that before any broadcast he told Ms. Sawyers
that when he said Dexedrine was technically illegal to use as a diet pill, he meant that the rules
and regulations; discouraged a Schedule II substance, which is Dexedrine, to be used as weight
reduction. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 116.] The regulations, which Sawyers read, state that they are
guidelines and the lower court so ruled. Dr. Hirsche testified doctors may vary the way medicine
is used for the good of a patient, and he did not consider Dr. Jensen to be suggesting a false
diagnosis. [R 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] Most importantly, prior to the first story, Dr. Jensen did
an on-camera interview and he explained he had done additional research; and said Dexedrine
was used for weight loss when he was in medical school, but that it was not used now. [PL's Ex.
37 at 6] The Media Defendants left Dr. Jensen's correction out of any of their stories. They
leave it out now.
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I On page 13 of the Media Defendants' Brief, they quote another portion of Defs. Ex.
99. Gting this exchange again demonstrates a failure to marshal. Dr. Jensen explained that he
was referring to the fact that he had some patients on Fastin, one of which stated that when
Fastin wore off, she would get tired and could not function, and that he had had a similar
experience. He also testified he believed Ms. Sawyers had work fatigue, so he explained to her
a way to avoid crashing once Fastin wore off. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 138-40.] Dr. Hirsche testified
that Dr. Jensen was not telling her how to abuse the drugs, he was telling her how not to abuse
it. [K 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.]
j. The Media Defendants misstate: "[a]t no time during the office visit did Dr. Jensen tell
Sawyers that he wanted his conversation with her to be 'confidential' or that Sawyers should not
disclose it to any third party." This statement makes it sound as if Dr. Jensen knew that she was
doing a story on him. He did not. [K 6864 (Sawyers) at 116 (testified that she did not tell Dr.
Jensen she was going to photograph him); & 6871 (Sawyers) at 57-60.] Nor did Dr. Jensen
know Ms. Sawyers was recording with a hidden camera. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 60.] Dr. Jensen
believed he was treating a patient for weight loss who feared losing her job because KTVX
determined she was overweight. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 58-59; & 6865 (Jensen) at 99-100,119;
K 6866 (Jensen) at 36, 58,117-18.]
k

The heading on page 15 and subsequent paragraphs are incorrect. The Media

Defendants did not continue their investigation. Instead, they showed a portion of the hidden
camera tape and not the second on-camera interview tape to DOPL, and asked what it would
do about Dr. Jensen. [K 6871 (Sawyers) at 83-84; PL's Ex. 19.] Further, Ms. Sawyers did not
disclose to DOPL that the hidden camera tape did not show the last 15 minutes of the
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examination because it shut off prematurely. [K 6871 (Sawyers) at 84-85; & 6866 (Jensen) at
39.]
1. The only reason Ms. Sawyers did a second interview was because she bungled the
installing of the hidden camera. She lacked video of Dr. Jensen. [K 6871 (Sawyers) at 63-64.]
Consequently, Ms. Sawyers did a second on-camera interview. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 8-9; PL's Ex.
37.] Dr. Jensen did not confirm the "illegality' of his earlier Dexedrine statement. Dr. Jensen
told Ms. Sawyers that prescribing Dexedrine is something that cannot be done now in
conformity with state regulations. [PL's Ex. 37 at 6.] The Media Defendants never included that
statement in any broadcast. [PL's Ex.s 19,20,21.] Further, as explained to the jury, physicians,
based on medical judgment, are allowed to make prescriptions outside the regulations. [K 6865
(Jensen) at 116; K 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] The Court ruled the regulations were guidelines. [R
1016,1021-22]
m. On September 5,1995, they aired the first false light broadcast.7 [PL's Ex. 19 &Defs.
Ex. 115.] It falsely represented that Dr. Jensen offered illegal drugs to Ms. Sawyers. [PL's Ex.
19 &Defs. Ex. 115.] It further falsely insinuated that Lynette Singleton was Dr. Jensen's patient
by showing her picture and stating that she had easily obtained diet pills from her doctor. [PL's
Ex. 19 & Defs. Ex. 115.] She was not. The broadcast showed clips of the hidden camera
interview and the second interview, while making the viewer think that Ms. Sawyers had done
one continuous interview. [PL's Ex. 19 &Defs. Ex. 115.] The story did not include Dr. Jensen's
filmed correction. [PL's Ex. 19.]
n. Following the first broadcast, IHC dropped Dr. Jensen from its insurance plans. [R
7

No one at KTVX had any hidden-camera experience. [R 6864 (Edwards) at 19.]
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6866 (Jensen) at 63.] Dr. Jensen cannot bill the largest insurance provider in the state for
medical services to patients. [K 6866 Qensen) at 64.] Dr. Jensen was denied reinstatement. [K
6866 Qensen) at 66,112-15; PL's Ex. 199.] He was also fired from the FirstMed Clinic. [R 6866
(Jensen) at 62.]
o. In section 8 of their Brief, the Media Defendants fail to admit they hounded DOPL
to go after Dr. Jensen. [R. 6871 (Sawyers) at 83-85.]
p. On June 17,1996 Media Defendants aired the second false light broadcast. [PL's Ex.
20.] They falsely said Dr. Jensen gave Ms. Sawyers a prescription without following state law.
The broadcast reported: 1) physicians must determine that the patient made a good-faith effort
to lose weight; 2) physicians must perform a thorough physical examination; and 3) physicians
must rule out the existence of health conditions that would be aggravated by the drug. Ms.
Sawyers stated that Dr. Jensen did none of these. However, he did determine that Ms. Sawyers
had made a substantial good-faith effort to lose weight. Also, he was not able to finish the
examination because she abruptly left his office. And Dr. Jensen did rule out contraindications.
[R 6866 Qensen) at 139; 192 Ins. 17-19; K 6865 (Jensen) at 85; 130-31.] Ms. Sawyers also said
Dr. Jensen broke the law a second time when he made the Dexedrine statement. However, as
described above, the statement was not illegal. [K 6865 (Jensen) at 116; & 6871 (Hirsche) at
133.]
q. On November 6, 1996, the Media Defendants defamed Dr. Jensen. [PL's Ex. 21.]
Using excerpts from earlier broadcasts, the Media Defendants placed Dr. Jensen in the same
category as physicians who: perform illegal abortions; disfigure patients; sexually abuse their
patients; pass out drugs to drug addicts; and/or kill patients with lethal injections. The story
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implied Dr. Jensen was the physician who gave drugs to addicts. [PL's Ex. 21.] Ms. Sawyers
repeated her statement regarding the promise of illegal drugs, knowing what Dr. Jensen really
said was "if Fastin didn't work for you, I would be willing to work with you uh rmybe using
Dexedrine." [Def.'s Ex. 99 at 2 (emphasis added).] She also knew from the second interview
Dr. Jensen would not prescribe Dexedrine to her. [PL's Ex. 37 at 6.] Additionally, the
Physicians Licensing Board Chairman testified that Dexedrine is not an illegal drug. Rather,
"illegal drugs are Schedule 1 such as cocaine and marijuana." [K 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.]
r. The Media Defendants wrongfully state that Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence
showing that he lost any job, position or was denied work opportunities as a result of the third
broadcast. Appellant's Brief at 21. Dr. Jensen's economic losses were earlier summarized.
While Dr. Jensen did finally find employment after being fired from nearly all the positions he
was then working at because of the broadcasts, working as a nursing home physician is the last
place Dr. Jensen wanted to work as a physician. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 102 (Dr. Jensen testified
that nursing home medicine is one of the least desirable type of jobs for a physician).] Further,
without IHC coverage, many patients cannot be treated by Dr. Jensen because they will not
receive reimbursement from insurance. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 63-64.]
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. Appellee's Argument
Dr. Jensen's 'false light invasion of privacy claims are not time-barred. A 'false light
invasion of privacy is one of four different categories falling under the INVASION OF
PRIVACY TORT. Invasion of Privacy is not a defamation tort. It is a separate and distinct
tort. Consequently, it is not subject to the one-year statute of limitation in § 78-12-29(4) which
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covers defamation, slander and libel. See Ccoc v Hatthy 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) wherein both
torts are analyzed. A 'false light tort claim' is based upon true or false statements which place
the individual in a false light to his determent. In contrast a defamation tort consists of false
statements which injure the reputation of the individual.
Dr. Jensen's invasion of privacy by way of intrusion arises from the surreptitious video
recording of Dr. Jensen by Ms. Sawyers while being treated as a patient in a private examination
room with the door closed. They are actionable. All the doctors who were asked testified that
they would be highly offended if secretly taped while treating a patient. They all had the
expectation that the examination room was a private place for the physician.
Dr. Jensen was also the subject of the Media Defendants' attempt to show that DOPL
was not properly performing its function to regulate doctors under its charge. The Media
Defendants tried to mold Dr. Jensen to its predetermined "Story idea" in order to put pressure
on DOPL to change its way and to go after Dr. Jensen.
Each of the broadcasts were not substantially true. The first broadcast's innuendo was
that Dr. Jensen was Lynette Singleton's doctor from whom she had obtained diet pills very
casually. He was not. Many of the Media Defendants' statements were flat-out false as
exemplified by Ms. Sawyers repeated allegation that Dr. Jensen had promised her illegal drugs.
He did not. In the second broadcast the Media Defendants alleged that the State was going after
the license of Dr. Jensen. See Defendants/Appellants Exhibit 9. The truth according to a
DOPL Assistant Attorney General and also the head of the physicians licensing board was that
DOPL never sought revocation of Dr. Jensen's license. [R 6857 (Allred) at 99.] Further, Dr.
Jensen did not instruct Ms Sawyers how to abuse a drug but instructed her as how not to abuse
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the drug. [K 6865 Qensen) at 139-141.]
Dr. Jensen testified that he was injured most by the third broadcast. From this broadcast,
the clinic, which had supported him throughout the ordeal of the earlier two broadcasts, warned
him that if the notoriety continued they would have to let him go. They then started to cut back
his hours. The cut in hours forced him to go into the nursing home industry with its poor pay,
long hours, and serious mental stress due to the terminal illnesses of nursing home patients. The
jury had the unique opportunity of being able to see the hidden camera tape, the interview tape,
and the three broadcasts which were produced. From that they were able to determine the truth
or falsity of the broadcasts and the statements contained therein.
B. Cross-Appellant* s Argument
The Media Defendants could not have done the three broadcasts without the hidden
camera video. As the hidden camera episode violated § 76-9-402(1) (a) and (b), and under § 769-406 attorney fees are allowed where there has been a violation of § 76-9-401 etaL, the Media
Defendants should be assessed attorney fees for all damage caused by their violation of 76-9402(1) (a) and (b). Further, the gathering of information claims are the proximate cause of the
broadcast claims in such a way as to justify an attorney s fee award on all claims.
The jury's award was not duplicative and all of Dr. Jensen's claimed costs should be
awarded as necessary disbursements.
VI. APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
A.

The Issues of Fact Raised by the Media Defendants in this Appeal
Must, as a Matter of Law, be Determined in Favor of Dr. Jensen. The
Media Defendants Failed to Marshal the Evidence.

When challenging a jury's verdict, the appellant must "marshal the evidence in support
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of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict." Hardngv Bell, 2002 UT 108,119,57 P.3d 1093,1097.
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's
advocate. Counsel must remove himself or herself from the
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order
to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
Nedyv Bennett, 2002 UT App 189,111, 51 P.3d 724,727-28 (citation omitted).
The duty to marshal is not "satisfied by merely making the 'pertinent excerpts from the
record readily available to a reviewing court,' nor by presenting 'in minute detail all the evidence
before' the trial court." Id (citations omitted.) Instead, the appellant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the findings and show why, given all of the evidence supporting the
findings, the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence." Harris v IE S Assoc, 2003 UT
App. 112,140,471 Utah Adv. Rep. 9. "The marshaled facts should 'correlate particular items
of evidence with the challenged findings,' supporting the findings with all available evidence in
the record, and only then should an appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged
findings are clearly erroneous." Nedy, 2002 UT App 189,112, 51 P.3d 724, 728. I n the face
of an appellant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court's "most likely
action is summary affirmance of the challenged trial court decision." Id
In this case, the Media Defendants make six arguments. All but the first raise issues of
fact, La, whether the evidence supported a motion for summary judgment, a directed verdict,
or a motion to set aside the verdict. Nowhere do the Media Defendants marshal the evidence.
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All they do is argue selective evidence favorable to their position. The Media Defendant's
arguments do not even begin to meet their marshaling burden. See Crvokston v Five Ins. Exdo.,
817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991). When an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, it cannot show
that the findings are clearly erroneous and the reviewing court must presume that the evidence
supported the verdict. Harding, 2002 UT 108,121, 57 P.3d at 1097. As a result, the findings
of fact of the trial court and the jury must be accepted as true. The Media Defendants' failure
to meet their marshaling burden is alone sufficient grounds to reject any challenges to the jury's
findings. See Crvokston, 817 P.2d at 800.
Furthermore, it is now too late for the Media Defendants to remedy their failure to meet
their marshaling burden. "[A] party must marshal all of the evidence supportive of the verdict
in its opemngbruf." Harding 2002 UT 108,121 n3,57 P.2d at 1097, n3. (emphasis added). Rule
24(c), Utah & App. Proa, further dictates, the failure to marshal the evidence cannot be
remedied in a reply brief. An appellant cannot reserve its sufficiency of the evidence challenge
and wait to marshal the evidence in a reply brief. Such a procedure would deprive the appellee
of any opportunity to respond and defend the sufficiency of the evidence and the findings of
fact. See A das Steel, Incy v Utah State Tax Commn, 2002 UT 112,141, 61 P.3d 1053,1062.
B.

An Appellate Court Does Not Review a Pretrial Denial of Summary
Judgment After Juiy Trial and Adverse Judgment on the Merits.

Sections; 1,2 & 4 of the Media Defendants' argument are based on a summary judgment
denial. Many jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit, have ruled that a summary judgment
denial is not reviewable on appeal after a trial. See Whalenv Unit Rig Inc, 97A F.2d 1248 (10th
Gr. 1992). "[S]ummary judgment was not intended to be a bomb planted within the litigation
at its early stages and exploded on appeal." Id at 1251. (quoting Holleyv Northmp Worldwide
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Aircraft Sens., Inc., 835 F.2d 1375,1377-78 (11th Or. 1988).
Judicial economy does not allow an appeal of a denial of summary judgment after a full
trial because the purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of
a trial. See McBridev Jones, 615 P.2d 431 (Utah 1980). A summary judgment motion becomes
moot. SeePahuta v Massey-Fergison, Inc., 170 F.3d 125 (2d Qr. 1999); Gregory v Kilbride, 565
S.E.2d 685 (N.C Q. App. 2002); Chesapeake Paper Prods. Ca v Stone & Webster Engg Corp., 51
F.3d 1229 (4th Qr. 1995) (Court of Appeak will not review a pretrial denial of motion for
summary judgment after full trial and final judgment on merits); Watson v A rmicD Steel, Inc., 29
F.3d 274 (7th Or. 1994) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins.Ca v Golden Triangle, 121 F.3d 351 (8th Or.
1997) (agreeing with the 9th and Federal Circuits that once a party lost at summary judgment and
subsequently loses after a trial, the denial of summary judgment cannot be appealed.
C.

The Tort of False Light Invasion of Privacy is Governed by the Utah FourYear Statute of Limitation. It is Not an Enumerated Exception to the
Residual Four-Year Limitation Period of UCA§ 78-12-25(3).

The scope of the four-year limitation period in subsection (3) of § 78-12-25 has been
clear for over 100 years: "torts having nowhere else been provided for in the statute. . . [are]
embraced under the general provisions of Section 20, [now sub-section (3)] of UCA § 78-12-25."
See Thorns v UnionPac RRCa, 1 Utah 235 (1875). As the Utah Appellate Court acknowledged
in Hodgs v Hoidl, 2000 UT App 171,19, 4 P.3d 803, 805, section 78-12-25(3) "applies to all
actions for relief that [are] not otherwise covered by any other section." citing Branting v Salt
Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 311, 153 P. 995, 1001 (1915). Seealso, Olsenv Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345,
1347 n.l (Utah 1993) ("A cause of action... that is not subject to a specific statutory limitation
period is governed by the residual four-year limitation period found in § 78-12-25(3).")
Utah courts have newr held that any specific statute of limitation applies to a false light
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invasion of privacy claim There is, however, compelling case law applying other states' catch-all
provision to false light invasion of privacy claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals forthe 10th Circuit
upheld a Kansas court ruling that the "statute of limitations for an invasion of privacy claim"
fell under the two-year tort catch-all provision. Nezwombv En$e, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Gr.
1987); see also, Janes v HCA Health Senkes (f Kansas, Inc, 1998 WL 159505 * 17 (D. Kan. 1998)
(the court refused to apply the 1-year defamation statute of limitation, holding that the two-year
catch-all statute of limitations applies to "invasion of privacy actions including those based on
false light publicity"). Similarly, in Auk v HustlerMagzzine, Inc., 1986 WL 20896 * 6 (D. Or.
1986) the court noted that the Oregon legislature, like the Utah legislature, had not "enumerated
the statute of limitations for invasion of privacy" and held that the two-year statute of limitations
for invasion of privacy applied. In Jensen v Times Mirror Company, 634 F. Supp. 304, 315 (D.
Conn. 1986) the federal court found that a false light claim is not otherwise covered by a specific
statute of limitation, the all embracing three-year tort statute of limitations applied.
Even though the tort of false light invasion of privacy is not specifically enumerated in
any statute of limitation, the Media Defendants mistakenly argue that the one-year statute of
limitation for "defamation" should apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (1996). They say
the nature of those two torts are so "closely allied" that the same limitation period applies to
each. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitation to be applied is
determined "by the nature of the action and not by the pleading labels chosen." DauckonLurrber
Sales, Inc v Bonneulle Imi, Inc, 794 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah 1990). In Cathoo, Inc v Valentiner Crane
Bruryes OnpnAvchitects, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1997), the Court reaffirmed explaining, "[f]or
purposes of determining the statute of limitations, it is the gravamen of the claim which governs,
not the form in which it is pleaded." Just because two torts may both involve the same conduct,
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that does not "ally the two closely enough to share the same limitation period. Application of
this test in Hodges v Howell, supra is instructive, as the factual analysis of Hodges, is so similar to
the present case that it dictates the conclusion that defamation and false light are distinct and
separate. In Hodges the issue was which limitation period applied to the tort of "alienation of
affection." No limitation period for this tort is specified in statute. The plaintiff argued
alienation of affection is so "closely related with" seduction that they should share the one year
limitation period. The Utah Appellate Court recognized both torts may involve the same
conduct, ie, sexual relations, but that sexual relations was not an essential element of alienation
of affection, finding that the elements of the torts were not the same and the interests protected
were not the same. The court concluded that they were not sufficiently related to share the same
limitation period.
Using this same analysis, the Supreme Court mRussdlv ThomsonNeuspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d
896 (Utah 1992), held that the invasion of privacy is "distinct" from defamation. The Court
recognized that the tort of defamation only protects an individual's reputation while the tort of
invasion of privacy, false light, protects an "individual's interest in being let alone." The
gravamen of a false light invasion of privacy action constitutes"publicity that unreasonablyplaces
the other in a false light before the public. See Ccoc v Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A & 652E (1977). Unlike defamation, the statements
complained of in an action for false light need not be false. In fact, "an action for invasion of
privacy may be the only available remedy when the statements complained of are not themselves
false, but merely place plaintiff in a false light." Russell, 842 P.2d at 906-907. The Court
concluded that an invasion of privacy claim such as false light invasion of privacy is distinct from
a defamation claim. They are not "so closely allied" so as to share the same limitation period.
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The trial court correctly applied the four-year residual limitation period of § 78-12-25(3).
D.

The Evidence Geariy Supports and the Jury Properly Found the Media
Defendants' Intrusion was Substantial and Highly Offensive.

The Media Defendants make four arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence
on the invasion of privacy claims: 1) whether there was an intrusion into Dr. Jensen's "sphere
of personal privacy;" 2) whether the Media Defendants' actions were "highly offensive;" 3)
whether Dr. Jensen had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a state-licensed and regulated
physician; and 4) whether the defamatory and false-light statements were "substantially true."
All of these involve issues of fact and were found in favor of Dr. Jensen by the jury on
the evidence. Although, the Media Defendants site to numerous cases whose fact situations
result in a ruling against the plaintiff, they are all fact specific and distinguishable. Nowhere do
the Media Defendants marshal the evidence supporting the jury's findings upheld by the lower
trial court in not directing a verdict for Appellants or in granting a judgment not withstanding
the verdict.
1.

The Media Defendants Tortuously and Unreasonably Intruded Upon Dr.
Jensen's "Sphere of Personal Privacy"

A successful plaintiff must prove two elements to establish an intrusion upon seclusion
claim: (a) there was "an intentional substantive intrusion, physically or otherwise upon the
solitude or seclusion of the complaining party", and (b) the intrusion "would be highly offens ive
to a reasonable person." See Stienv Marriott OwnershipResortsy Inc., 944 P.2d 374, (Utah Q. App.
1997). The rationale is that one should be protected against intrusion by others into one's
private "space" orprivate affairs. ".... this intrusion tort gives redress for interference with one's
'right to be left alone'." Peoplefor theEthical Treatment cfA rirmls v BobbyBenxirri, Ltd, 895 P.2d
1269 (Nev. 1995). To have a protectable interest in "seclusion," a plaintiff must show that he
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had an actual expectation of "seclusion or solitude" and that that expectation was reasonable,
both issues of fact.
Where the intrusion takes place is not determinative of whether an expectation of
privacy is reasonable. See Sanders v A rrzrimnBrvackmtin^

978 P.2d 67,77 (Cal. 1999).

Sanders involved a TV reporter recording a conversation between the reporter and a telepsychic.
The California Supreme Court held that since the workplace where the conversation took place
was not generally open to the public, the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy against
a TV reporter's covert videotaping even though the plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of
complete privacy because he was visible and audible to other coworkers.

Id

The

unreasonableness depended not on location but the nature of the intrusion, i.e., "a television
reporter's covert videotaping of the conversation" that was meant to be private. Id Likewise,
the communication between a doctor and his patient is meant to be kept private.
2.

The Media Defendants' Intrusion was "Highly Offensive."

The determination of the second element of the tort, i e. whether the intrusion was highly
offensive to a reasonable person, is within the province of the jury. And the jury in this case so
found. Utah law also provides that the court must make a threshold determination of
"offensiveness." In doing so the court considers such factors as "the degree of intrusion, the
context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder's motives
and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy
is invaded.8 Stien, 944 P.2d at 379. Although the Media Defendants have not marshaled any
8

This is an interesting judicial gloss. As explained in Stien, it appears that the court must
make an initial determination that the claim is supported by sufficient evidence to withstand a
motion for summary judgment and/or a motion for a directed verdict before the claim maybe
submitted to the jury. The trial court made that determination twice and on the evidence before the
jury, the jury found for Dr. Jensen on the claim of intrusion.
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evidence, there was ample evidence upon which the trial judge based his ruling on "objective
offensiveness,"9 and upon which the juryfound that the Media Defendants violated Dr. Jensen's
right to privacy from unreasonable intrusion. See supra Statement of Facts l.g. and R . 6849
(Taylor) at 229.
Numerous courts have considered stiikingly similar factual situations and found that the
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the intrusion was highly offensive. The
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dietemtnv Tine, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Or. 1971), is illustrative. In
Dietenunn, the object of the intrusion was an individual who was ostensibly practicing medicine
without a license. L ife Magtzine entered into an arrangement with the District Attorneys Office
whereby Life's employees would visit the plaintiff, obtain pictures, and record the diagnosis and
treatment discussion. L ife would obtain evidence for the health department to be used against
the plaintiff and could then publish the pictures and the recorded conversation.
Life's employees went to plaintiff's home, misinterpreted why they were there, and by
using the ruse that "they were sent there by a friend," gained entrance into his den or office,
equipped with "gadgets" he used in his diagnosis. While the plaintiff "examined" one of the
employees, the other took a picture. The conversations were transmitted by radio transmitter
hidden in a purse to a tape recorder in a parked automobile. Consequently, the plaintiff was
arrested on the charge of practicing medicine without a license, and an article including the
picture later appeared in Life Magazine.
On these facts the Ninth Circuit affirmed a trial court judgment for invasion of privacy.
Dietenunn, 449 F.2d at 248. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the plaintiff invited the Life

9

Most jurisdictions require the court to make an initial determination that the expectation of
seclusion or solitude is "objectively reasonable."
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employees into his "den/office" and that the Life employees were parties to the recorded
conversations. Nevertheless, the court found that such a trespass was an intrusion "into spheres
from which an ordinary man in plaintiff's position could reasonably expect that the particular
defendant should be excluded." Id. at 249. The court explained:
Plaintiff's den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect
to exclude eavesdropping newsmen. He invited two of
defendant's employees to the den. One who invites another to his
home or office takes a risk that the visitor may not be what he
seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes
when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to
take the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by
photograph or recording, or in our modem world, in full living
color and hi-fi to the public at large or to any segment of it that the
visitor may select. A dfflerentrdeawMhawa mxt pernicious effect upon
the digrity cfrmn and it would surely lead to yarded conzmations and
conduct vhere candor is most uduedy eg. in the case cfdoctors andlawps.
Id (Emphasis added). News gathering does not create a license to trespass or to intrude by
electronic means into another's office. See Copdandv HubbardBroadcasting Inc., d/b/a KSTP
T. V., 526 N.W.2d 402,405 (Minn. 1995) (whether homeowners consent to allow a student into
their home for educational purposes encompassed consent to videotape events in the home for
a broadcast, is a factual issue precluding summary judgment.)
3.

As a State Regulated and Licensed Physician, Dn Jensen still had a
Reasonable Right to an Expectation of Privacy.

Dr. Jensen had a reasonable expectation that his examination room is within a sphere of
privacy for the doctor. This expectation was affirmed by every physician asked at trial. Doctors
Rosen, Purser, Badger and Canfield all testified the patient examination room is a "private
place." Dr. Badger explained that he would consider a camera in his patient room as an invasion
of his privacy. See Statement of Facts No. 8. Even the Media Defendants' expert witness, Dr.
Jack Taylor, agreed. [& 6849 (Taylor) at 229.] The nature of medical practice dictates that a
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physician must have an area where he may speak openly to his patient without it being broadcast
to the general public. Doctors must know their communications will not be broadcast so they
can be candid in discussing a patient's health problems and remedies.
The Media Defendants deny such a need of private seclusion. They urge two strings of
cases they say stand for the notion that "a physician has no expectation of privacy in how he
conducts his professional duties;" and that there is a "diminished expectation of privacy in the
workplace." The Media Defendants' analysis is wrong. In support of their first proposition, the
Media Defendants proffer 3 cases. The first, WashirigonPost Ca v United States Dept cfJustice,
863 F.2d 96,100 (D.C Qr. 1988), was a Freedom of Information Act case and has nothing to
do with the case at bar. The D.C Circuit held that unless there was a specific statutory
exemption from production, all documents held by the government were to be produced
pursuant to a FOIA request. The second proffered case was New York v Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987), a case involving a warrantless search. It has nothing to do with a civil tort for invasion
of privacy. Finally, Media Defendants cite Time, Inc. v Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) claiming that
this case espouses that when one's "professional career is involved," an individual "is
substantially without a right to privacy." However, that case makes no such holding. Moreover,
Time is not an expectation of privacy case. Rather, Time held that a "newsworthy person" may
not have an expectation of privacy insofar as his newsworthy status is concerned, but he does
have a right to privacy when the reported material contains falsehoods, even if the falsehoods
relate to the newsworthy event.
Although a public figure is substantially without a right of privacy, the Supreme Court
found that insofar as the published comments were 'fictionalized,' the public figure had a claim
for false light invasion of privacy
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But the constitutional guarantees can tolerate sanctions against
calculated falsehood without significant impairment of the
essential function. We held in New York Times that calculated
falsehood enjoyed no immunity in the case of alleged defamation
of a public official concerning his official conduct. Similarly
calculated falsehood should enjoy no immunity in the situation
here.
Tinx, 385 U.S. at 389-390. The Media Defendants also relied on, Spahnv Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y
2d 324 (1966) which has a similar holding as Time. Warren Spahn, a well known baseball pitcher,
a public figure, was successful in stopping the publication of an unauthorized, fictionalized,
biography.
The issue on appeal in the case at bar is factual. Did the Media Defendants fictionalize
the encounter with Dr. Jensen? Did they make changes in the wording calculated to mislead
the public? Did they broadcast false statements and omit correct statements which would have
revealed the truth? The jury determined that the Media Defendants did.
It is unnecessary to review each of the Media Defendants' authorities in purported
support of their claim that the false light claim should have been dismissed. Whether a
statement is true or false or calculated to mislead, is a factual question. Nowhere do they
present the evidence which would allow this court to make a determination as to whether the
juiy had sufficient evidence to support its findings.
The Media Defendants' second line of cases is proffered to suggest the "location" i.e.
"work place" is the determining factor of the reasonableness of the privacy expectation. The
cases proffered by the Media Defendants demonstrates this is not true. And why? Because
again "reasonable expectation" is an issue of fact. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 67. No one equates the
expectation of privacy between a doctor and his patient discussing medical problems in a closed
examination room with the expectation of privacy of a conversation in the administrative office
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of a medical laboratory involving a discussion with the laboratory's owner about general
laboratory procedures, Medarf LaboratoryMamgement Consultants v A rrErimnBwadcasttngConpiny^
306 F.3d 806 (9th Gr. 2002); with an area backstage at the Stardust Hotel where employees could
at all times hear and see what Berosini was doing, Berosiri^ 895 P.2d at 1279; with the expectation
of privacy where an employer knowingly monitors and records its employees' business and
personal calls, Ali v Dou^as Cable Comntmications, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D Kan. 1996); and with
the expectation of the secrecy of a telephone number that is recorded by the phone company
in the phone company's exchange for legitimate business purposes, Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979). Further reliance on Smith is misplaced. Srrith dealt with whether obtaining a phone
number automatically recorded by the phone company when dialed by a defendant, violated
Fourth Amendment Rights. It has nothing to do with the offering of professional services to
a "complete stranger."
E.

The Media Defendants' Representations in the Three Broadcasts were not
Substantially True and the Jury so found on the Evidence.

In an attempt to overcome the factual determination that the statements in the broadcast
were defamatory and placed Dr. Jensen in a false light, the Media Defendants rely on claims such
as: the broadcasts contained "substantial truth," and "while some of the defendants'" published
statements may not have been literallytrue... the "gist" and "sting" of the broadcasts as a whole
. . . were mcontrovembly suktantially truthful, and, "[i]n sum, the broadcasts are not actionable
because they did not make [Dr. Jensen] significantly worse off than a completely or literally
truthful publication would have." The Media Defendants' argument does not raise an appealable
issue. Importantly, the jury was properly instructed on the issue of a "false statement".10 And
10

The trial court instructed the jury on the definition of a "false statement" as it relates to
both the defamation and false light claims. Instruction No. 50 in pertinent part essentially followed
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after hearing all the evidence, the jury did not find that the broadcasts were "substantially" or
"literally true or that Dr. Jensen was not "significantly worse off" as a result of the Media
Defendants' misrepresentations, half truths and innuendo that cast him in a false light.
Further, the Media Defendants' argument is inaccurate. When one compares what was
said in the broadcasts with the facts the Media Defendants left out of their Brief, one can see the
defamation, and the false light. In all broadcasts, they deliberately left out conversations with
Dr. Jensen and made inferences which cast him in a false light.
Inferential false light was recognized in Russdl vABQInc,

1995 WL 330920 (N.D. 111.

1995) where the Court noted that plaintiff complained the "defendants took her statements out
of context and incorporated them into the broadcast in such a way that a viewer would wrongly
infer that she was an unscrupulous and dishonest merchant". This the court found to be a
"classic example of a false light invasion of privacy claim." Id at * 5. "It is not plaintiff's
statements themselves that allegedly injured her reputation, it was how defendants used those
statements in their program and allegedly harmed her." Id See also, Haynes v A lived A. Kmphy
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222,1229 (7th Gr. 1993). A jury in the case at bar could and did conclude that the
way in which the Media Defendants presented out-takes, played sound bits, and omitted
material, placed Dr. Jensen in a false light, and injured his reputation. See Ritzmmn v Weekly
World New, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that "whether the publication
does actually place the subject in a false light and whether that false light would be highly

the Media Defendants' proposed instruction No. 36. The instruction covered all the issues of
"substantial truth as raised by the Media Defendants in their opening brief. The court instructed,
inter alia, "The statement to be true, need not be absolutely, totally or literally true, but must be
substantially true. A statement is considered to be true if it is substantially true or that the gist of the
statement is true. When a statement is so near the truth that fine distinctions must be drawn on
words pressed out of their ordinary usage to sustain any claim of falsity, you are to consider the
statement as being true."
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offensive to a reasonable person are questions of fact"). Id at 1340-41.
The following examples are offered not in an effort to marshal all the evidence, as that
is the responsibility of the Appellants, but to indicate to the Court that there was evidence to
support the juiy's finding that the broadcasts were not "substantially true/'
Representation:

"During our visits he [Dr. Jensen] never asked if I
had high blood pressure.

Truth:

Prior to Dr. Jensen prescribing any pills, his assistant took Ms.
Sawyers' blood pressure. [R6865 (Jensen) at 125 -126.] The Media
Defendants admit this fact in footnote 29 on page 39 of thenOpening Brief.

Representation:

"He never asked . . . if I had diabetes."

Truth:

Ms. Sawyers filled out her medical history and a complete medical
checklist. Dr. Jensen reviewed this history prior to prescribing any
pills. She also told Dr. Jensen she did not have diabetes. [K 6865
(Jensen) at 125 - 128.]

Representation:

"Dr. Jensen did none of these."

Truth:

In making this claim the Media Defendants did not explain Ms.
Sawyers provided her medical history, and that her blood pressure,
pulse and respiration were charted. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 125 - 126.]
Further, Dr. Jensen knew that Ms. Sawyers did not have any drug
allergies. [K 6865 (Jensen) at 128.] This part of the visit was not
recorded by Ms. Sawyers. Dr. Jensen also reviewed the medical
history and knew that Ms. Sawyers claimed she would lose her job
if she did not lose weight. [K 6868 (Scott) at 72-75.] Additionally,
the recording device turned off before the consultation with Dr.
Jensen was completed. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 39 and & 6871
(Sawyers) at 60-61.] Finally, Ms. Sawyers abruptly changed the
subject and left the examination room before Dr. Jensen had
completed his examination. [R. 6865 (Jensen) at 85; 130-31.]

Representation:

" . . . Dr. Michael Jensen. He's the one we caught
on tape promising me illegal drugs."

Truth:

Dexedrine is not an "illegal drug." [R. 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.]
It was, however, not proper to prescribe Dexedrine for weight
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loss. Dr. Jensen did not offer to prescribe Dexedrine [Def.'s Ex.
99.] At most, he stated he may be able to. Id The Media
Defendants admit that "Dr. Jensen did not literally 'promise'
Sawyers he'd prescribe Dexedrine for her..." See Appellants' Brief
p. 38. After Dr. Jensen reviewed the regulations he discovered
that it was no longer proper in Utah to prescribe Dexedrine for
weight loss and he told Ms. Sawyers this before the first broadcast.
[PL's Ex. 37 at 6.]
Representation:
Truth:

"The state is going after Dr. Jensen's license."

The State of Utah did not seriously consider revoking Dr. Jensen's license.
[R6857(Allred)at99.]
Although Dr. Jensen is a private person, and actual malice need not be shown, the Media

Defendants knew that material in their broadcasts was false and included it to cast Dr. Jensen
in a false light.
F.

The Trial Court did Not Abuse its Discretion in Affirming the Jury's
Award of Damages as a Result of the Media Defendants' Third Broadcast

After hearing all the evidence, the jury found that Dr. Jensen suffered economic damages
of $1,000,000 as a result of the Media Defendants' third broadcast. In denying the motion for
a new trial and to set aside the economic damages flowing from the broadcast, the trial court
reasonably found the jury acted within its proper bounds. In reviewing a trial judge's ultimate
decision to grant or deny a new trial or remittitur, an appellate court will only reverse if there is
no reasonable basis for that decision. See Crookston v Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah
1991). Further, an appellate court "will not disturb this determination absent a gross abuse of
discretion." Sheets v Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383,1390 (10th Or. 1995). The jury's award of
damages should not be set aside on appeal unless the jury award is "so excessive . . . as to shock
the judicial conscience". The amount and allocation of damages must be left to the sound
discretion of the jury. SeeBurtenshawv Bountiful In. Cay 61 P.2d 312,316 (1936) ("We recognize
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the fact that damages are not always susceptible to exaa and accurate proof and a great deal of
latitude must be taken by the jury in fixing the amount of damages in such case

In many

cases, although substantial damages are established, their amount is insofar as susceptible of
pecuniary admeasurement, either entirely uncertain or extremely difficult of ascertainment; in
such cases plaintiff is not denied all right of recovery, and the amount is fixed by the jury in the
exercise of sound discretion under proper instruction of the court.")
Following the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Jensen and awarding damages, the Media
Defendants argued that the jury's award of damages relating to the third broadcast was not
supported by the evidence. Thus, they submitted to the scrutiny of the trial judge the jury's
determination of economic damages. The trial court considered the motion and reviewed the
award in light of the evidence and the form of verdict given the jury by the trial court. The trial
court found that some of the separate damages awarded were duplicative and reduced the
judgment. But the trial court denied the motion for a new trial and refused to reduce or vacate
the amount of the jury's award of damages relating to the third broadcast, thus giving further
solidarity to the judgment. Under these circumstances not only must the appellate court give
deference to die trial court, the appellate court sustains the verdict and the trial court's refusal
to set aside the verdict unless the trial court "abused its discretion".
When the determination of the jury has been submitted to the
scrutiny and judgment of the trial judge, his [or her] action thereon
should be regarded as giving further solidarity to the judgment. See
Elkingonv Foist, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Or, as we said in
Geary v Cain, 69 Utah at 358, 255 P. at 423, a[I]n case of doubt,
the deliberate action of the trial court should prevail."
Cmokston, 817 P.2d at 806.
Whether there is a reasonable basis for the trial court's decision is a question of fact. The
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Media Defendants recognized this in framing this issue for this court, La, "there was no evidence
demonstrating that Dr. Jensen had suffered any economic losses as a result of that broadcast."
But in recognizing that the issue is factual, they still did not give this Court the evidence to
enable it to decide whether the evidence relied on by the jury and by the trial court was
sufficient. They failed to marshal the evidence.
Although the Media Defendants pay lip service to this obligation, they fail miserably.
The words of the Utah Supreme Court in Gvoksta% supra, apply here: "...[the Media Defendants
have] made no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the juiy findings.... In fact, all [the
Media Defendants] have... done is argue selected evidence favorable to its position. That does
not begin to meet the marshaling burden it must cany. This failure alone is grounds to rejea
. . . the attack on the findings/' This is clear from a review of the language on page 41 of
Appellants' Brief. The Media Defendants simply argue:
Here, the juiy awarded Dr. Jensen $1 million in pecuniary damages
on the basis of the third (November 6,1996) broadcast alone. [R
5782.] However, there was no evidence demonstrating that Dr.
Jensen had suffered any economic loss as a result of that
broadcast. The evidence of Dr. Jensen's economic damage at trial
was based almost entirely on the change of Dr. Jensen's medical
practice from family to nursing home practice, which occurred,
according to Dr. Jensen and his experts, as a result of Dr. Jensen's loss
of IHC Health Plans privileges in September 1995, rrvrethanayear
prior to the Noimber6> 1996 broadcast [R. 6856 0ensen) at 29, lines
2 - 5; R 6866 at 103.]
The Media Defendants refer to or quote some statements made by Dr. Jensen and his experts
of the effect of the first broadcast on Dr. Jensen's practice. After doing this exercise, the Media
Defendants state parenthetically on pages 42-43:
Although Dr. Jensen did testify regarding some negative events
which may have occurred after November 6. 1996. Le., that his
work hours at Our City Family Medical Center decreased over
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time,... [cite omitted] he produced no evidence that such effects
occurred, if at all, because of the November 6,1996 broadcast.33
(emphasis added)
Qtes to the record are omitted. In support of the underlined statement, the Media Defendants
cite to the following footnote 33 on pg. 43, which also fails to meet the marshaling burden:
To meet their burden of marshaling the evidence, [Media]
Defendants can only point to the testimony that Dr. Jensen cited
in his post-trial brief to support this portion of the judgment (none
of which establishes that economic losses were caused by the Nov.
6,1996 broadcast), [cites omitted]
The Media Defendants then set forth a string of cites to the trial testimony of Dr. Jensen. That
is the sum and substance of the Media Defendants' attempt at marshaling.

Nowhere do the

Media Defendants refer to Dr. Jensen's statement that he was financially damaged by each of
the three broadcasts, [R 6866 (Jensen) at 104] or that after the third broadcast he had to find
another job because he understood that his employer cut back his hours and would fire him.
[K 6866 0ensen) at 98-99.] Further, he testified that he had been "incredibly injured" by the
three broadcasts. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 118-119.] There was also testimony that after the third
broadcast, when Dr. Jensen was seeing patients, a lady in the waiting room saw him, recognized
him from the broadcast, threw up her arms and said, "I will not see Dr. Jensen." [K 6866
0ensen) at 43.] This is not the only factual testimony that supports the jury's and trial court's
finding of damages that resulted from and after the third broadcast. Dr. Frank Stuart also
testified that he prepared a study wherein he looked at all the facts of the case and made an
assessment of all the economic losses suffered by Dr. Jensen as a result of all three broadcasts.
[R. 6850 (Stuart) at 35.] Dr. Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniary losses were between
$1,595,783.00 to $2,195,094.00 including benefits lost. [K 6850 (Stuart) at 69 &PL's Ex. 210.]
CPA Smith also testified on Dr. Jensen's losses.
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It is true that in presenting their damage calculations at trial, Dr. Jensen's experts did not
compartmentalize the damages by broadcast. Instead, as Dr. Stuart explained, he prepared his
damage calculations based on all of the facts of the case. It was left to the trial court's verdict
form for the jury and ultimately for the trial court itself to apply the content of the three
broadcasts and the testimony relating to Dr. Jensen's damages to the experts calculation of
damages suffered by Dr. Jensen and to allocate these damages among the broadcasts. The jury
did that, and the trial judge who sat through the month-long trial and heard all the evidence
found the allocation to be reasonable based on the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion. The damage award and judgment must be affirmed.
G.

The Media Defendants' Misstatements arc Not Protected by the Public
Interest or Fair Report Privileges and they arc Not Entitled to a De Novo
Review.

The Media Defendants' statements concerning a private individual are not protected by
the constitutional actual malice standard. But in this case that is irrelevant. The Media
Defendants knewthat material in their broadcasts was false and intentionally omitted facts which
would have shown that the statements made and inference intentionally created in the broadcasts
were false. The jury found malice and awarded punitive damages in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 78-18-1. The Media Defendants asserted two qualified privileges against Dr. Jensen's
defamation and false light claims, now claiming that unless the evidence was sufficient to
overcome these privileges, punitive damages were not warranted. These privileges protect the
media from liability for defamatory statements and false light unless "constitutional malice" is
found. The Media Defendants are wrong. " Constitutional malice" is not the standard, but Utah
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) (a) is. And, the jury found malice.
The Media Defendants asserted the "public concern" privilege and the "fair and true
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report of official proceeding" privilege. Although neither is applicable, both are defeated by the
jurynecessarilyfinding "malice," ie. that the Media Defendants' statements were known bythem
to be false, or in making these statements that they had reckless disregard for the truth.
In Seegrrillerv KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) this court was called upon to decide
the degree of fault which a "private figure" must prove in a defamation action against a media
defendant. KSL argued that a conditional privilege applied to media comment on "a matter of
public interest." The court concluded there is no "public issue", or "public concern" privilege
in Utah and found: "[w]e are persuaded that the necessary degree of fault which must be shown
in a defamation case brought by a "private individual" against the media is negligence.
Also, Dr. Jensen is not a public figure. In the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion of Gertz v
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the court affirmed that a public figure is one who is thrust
or thrusts himself into notoriety at the forefront of a public controversy or who by reason of
their achievements or the vigor and success of their own efforts seek public attention. The Gertz
court explained that to become a public figure "involuntarily" is "exceedingly rare."11 Dr. Jensen
is not one of those "exceedingly rare" individuals who has "involuntarily" gained notoriety by
his achievement. He is not a "public figure." He did not seek fame or notoriety. He has not
thrust himself to the forefront of any public controversy. Being the subject of a media story
does not do the trick because the media would always have the privilege that the Gertz court and

11

As quoted by this Court in Seegmiller, "[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their
achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly
classified as public figures... Hypothetically, it maybe possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntarily public figures
must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as
public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment."
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this court in Seegrriller, irfray found not to exist. There is no constitutional privilege for the Media
Defendants when commenting on a private individual's actions. And there is no right oideww
review by the Appellate Court. SeeNewYork Times Ca v SiAlivm> 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
H.

The Jury was Shown Clear and Convincing Evidence Supporting a Finding
of Malice. Subsequently, the Trial Court Found Evidence Sufficient to
Support the Jury's Finding of Malice when it Denied the Media
Defendants' Motion for a New Trial.

The jury was instructed under Jury Instruction 67 that "[bjefore any award of punitive
damages can be considered on Plaintiff's Defamation or False Light claims, the plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant published a defamatory falsehood
about Plaintiff knowing it was false or in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false and
that the Defendant acted with 'personal malice' toward Plaintiff. Personal malice means that the
Defendant acted with hatred or ill will towards Plaintiff, or with an intent to injure Plaintiff, or
acted willfully or maliciously towards Plaintiff."
The District Court in its order denying Defendants' Motions for New Trial, to Alter or
Amend the Judgment and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ruled that "there was
competent evidence of malice sufficient to sustain the jury's award of punitive damages." See
Defendants' Ex. 6, Court Order of September 26, 2001.
Under instruction 67, the jury was held incorrectly to the higher standard established in
Gertz and set forth in New York Times v Sidlizun, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which bars media liability
for defamation of a public official absent proof that the defamatory statements were published
with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. New York Times involved a
public official suing for libel. Dr. Jensen is not a public official. Even so, the jury found that
the evidence satisfied the high public official standard for malice.
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I.

Defendants Cannot Justify their Malice by Facts Learned after their
Actions.

The Defendants argue that actions which they learned at trial justify their earlier actions.
Malice is not justified by facts to which they were not privy at the time of the acts, and the
Media Defendants' portrayal of the facts is not accurate. Dr. Jensen's nurse was an individual
he had known for a long period of time. He knew her medical history. And she was a medical
professional. The Media Defendants try to conclude, based on the evidence, that Dr. Jensen was
derelict in issuing her a prescription.
The same argument goes to Ms. Johnson. Dr. Jensen was knowledgeable of her medical
and physical history due to the 10 years of his involvement with her. The testimony from
numerous medical experts is that they often issued prescriptions away from the office in special
fact situations. Dr. Jensen did nothing wrong, but the Media Defendants wanted it to be wrong
to substantiate their preconceived Story. Without the false allegations of prescribing illegal
drugs, no physical examination, etc., no viewer would have thought anything wrong with what
Dr. Jensen did in issuing a prescription to Ms. Sawyers. Therefore, they create a scenario to
justify their Stoiy. The jury saw through the lies and false innuendos, and based on the evidence
presented, returned a verdict punishing the Media Defendants.
VII. CROSS-APPELLANTS'ARGUMENT
A.

Dr. Jensen should be Awarded Reasonable Attorneys' Fees on all of his
Overlapping Claims.

Prevailing parties are entitled to attorneys' fees on non-compensable claims that partially
overlap, either factually or legally, compensable claims. Dejawelnc v U.S. Energy Corp, 1999 UT
App 993 P.2d 222 (contract and tort claims based on related legal theories involving common
core of facts); Kurth v Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, 991 P.2d 113, 116 (noncompensable claim
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partially overlapped mechanic's lien action). In the instant action the lower court recognized the
overlapping claim concept, but misapplied it:
Some of Plaintiff's claims are based on obtaining information and
some are based on the broadcast of information. There is not a
core of facts common to all claims and the legal theories are
unrelated. Order July 31,2001 p. 5, lines 1-2. [R. 6779.]
The court then awarded fees only on the gathering of information claims.
Although Dr. Jensen's claims can loosely be categorized as gathering of information
claims and broadcast claims, that does not mean that the claims do not overlap. The opposite
is true. The media usually argue that the right or ability to gather information is central to its
ability to publish. See, eg Nixonv Warner ConmrnkutionSy Inc., 435 U.S. 589,609 (1978) (media
urged the court to find a constitutional right to have witness recordings copied); Bramburg v
HayeSy 408 U.S. 665,679-80 (1972) (media requested constitutional protection from identifying
sources); Gannett Ca v DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (petition to overturn the exclusion of the
press from pretrial proceedings).
That the gathering of information overlaps the media's ability to place Dr. Jensen in a
false light is demonstrated in the instant case. First, the Media Defendants used a sensational
news "story idea". They wanted to trick a doctor into wrongfully prescribing diet pills. [K 6849
(Roth) at 117.] They tried to persuade Dr. Jensen to do so over the phone even though they
knew it was wrong. When that failed, Ms. Sawyers committed a criminal act by falsely posing
as a patient needing diet medication12 and secretly videotaped Dr. Jensen in his examination
room [Def.'s Ex. 102.] They then selected bits of the tape, ignored Dr. Jensen's statements in
the second interview, and edited material out of context to broadcast three false but sensational

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402.
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stories consistent with their preconceived story.
In short, the gathering of the information was motivated by the Media Defendants'
original intent to do a sensational story. The misconduct committed in gathering information
gave the Media Defendants the ability to follow through with their original intent. In other
words, Dr. Jensen's claims overlap and are related to each other because each claim was part of
an overall scheme. Consequently, Dr. Jensen should be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees on
all of his claims.
B.

Attorney Sine's Allocation of Fees
Nonrecoverable Fees was Sufficient

between Recoverable and

The lower court declined to award attorney's fees to attorney Sine because "Mr. Sine
simply separated his time into two columns - compensable claims and other matters." Ruling
September 27,2001, p. 8 lines 17-18. [R 6776.] But, "an allocation is sufficient if the substance
of the process results in separating recoverable from nonrecoverable fees. Kdth Jorgensens Inc
vOgkn City Mall Cay 2001 UT App 128,26 P.3d 872,880. Bnxmv DavdK Richardson Gx Inc.,
1999 UT App 109,978 P.2d 470. If the court closely examines Attorney Sine's submissions, it
will see the criteria for fees was met. [R 6714.]
C,

Dr. Jensen should be Awarded all of His Claimed Costs because the Media
Defendants Failed to Comply with Rule 54(d)(2) and all of Dr. Jensen's
Costs were "Necessary Disbursements".
1.

The Media Defendants failed to comply with Rule 54(d)(2).

Dr. Jensen timely filed his Verified Memorandum of costs and necessary disbursements.
Theytotal $122,952.66. Rule 54(d)(2) clearly directs: "A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed
may, within seven days... file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the Court
Media Defendants never filed a motion to tax costs, only an objection. [R 6074.]
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2.

The costs claimed by Dr. Jensen should be awarded as "necessary
disbursements."

An application for an award under Rule 54(d)(2) is for "costs and necessary
disbursements." Dr. Jensen's Verified Memorandum included not only the costs allowed by
statute, but also deposition transcript costs, expert witness fees, court equipment expenses, and
out-of-pocket costs to take depositions. [R 5941.] The lower court did not quarrel that Dr.
Jensen's claimed costs were necessary disbursements. Instead, it strictly applied the rule
annunciated in Frarrptonv Wilson, 605 P2d 771,774 (Utah 1980) and explained:
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 'there is a distinction to
be understood' between legitimate and taxable costs and other
expenses of litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not
taxable as costs. [R 6764J
The Frarrpton rationale is that since costs were not recoverable at common law under the
American rule, they are allowable only in amounts and in a manner provided by statute.
Frarrptonv Wilson, 605 P2d at 774.
There are several compelling reasons why the Frarrpton rule should be reversed or
modified. First, unlike the FranptonnAe, Rule 54(d), does not distinguish between taxable costs
and necessary litigation expenses. Rule 54(d)(2) specifically provides that a party is to file a
verified memorandum of "costs and necessary disbursements." The FranptonnAe completely
removes the phrase "and necessary disbursements" out of Rule 54(d).
Further, the FranptonnAe follows the federal system, but the jurisdiction of federal courts
and Utah courts lead to different outcomes. In the federal system, the United States Supreme
Court's jurisdiction is limited to cases or controversies. No rule-making jurisdiction is specified.
In contrast, under Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court is
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specifically given judicial rule-making powers.13 Consequently, the issue of what necessary
disbursements should be awarded under its own Rule 54(d), is a question that should not be left
entirely to the legislature.
Finally, die FrarrptonnAe needs to be reversed or modified in light of the Open Court's
clause in Utah's Constitution. Plainly, "every person, for an injury done to him" cannot "have
a remedy by due course of law" in an open court if the court refuses to award "necessary
disbursements" to a prevailing party, but instead limits recoverable costs to those conservatively
specified by the legislature.
D.

The Juiy Awards on Dr. Jens en's Gathering of Information Claims arc Not
Duplicative

As set forth earlier, the common-law intrusion claim protects a person from a highly
offensive intrusion upon his solitude or seclusion. The jury received ample evidence supporting
the jury's award on the common-law intrusion claim. In addition, the legislature has provided
for a statutory privacy claim under § 76-9-401 et seq. In doing so, the legislature provided three
claims for recovery and separated them. It is evident from the verdict, that the jury also viewed
claims as separate and distinct by virtue of the fact that the jury did not award damages under
§ 76-9-402(1) (c),. The juiy found that the Media Defendants trespassed on property with intent
to subject Dr. Jensen to eavesdropping or surveillance. The jury also found that the Media
Defendants installed a hidden camera without Dr. Jensen's consent. The trespass violated § 769-402(1) (a) and the installation violated § 76-9-402(1) (b). In summary, the structure and content
of the statute shows that the common-law intrusion claim is separate and distinct from the
separate statutory privacy claims. Consequently, the jury, by awarding damages under each of
13

The legislature can overturn or amend a Supreme Court rule by a 2/3 vote. Utah Const.
Art. VIII § 4.
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the claims, did not award a duplicate recovery.
VIIL CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered in favor of Dr. Jensen should be
upheld and the remittitur entered on the gathering of information claims should be reversed.
Dr. Jensen should be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees on all of his claims as well as a
judgment for necessary disbursements.
Dated this

/

day of Judb, 2003.

DALE F. GARDINER
DOUGLAS J. PARRY
CRAIG KKLEINMAN
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Appendices

APPENDIX
1.

Dr. Jensen "Story Idea" composed by Geoff Roth (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 25).

2.

Video of KTVX Channel 4 News Broadcasts (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 19, 20 & 21).
a.
September 5,1995 "Diet Doctor."
b.
June 17,1996 "The State is Going after Dr. Jensen's License."
c.
November 6,1996 "Questionable Doctors."

3.

Mary Sawyers Physical Exam Form (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 30).

4.

Copy of Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

5.

Copy of Article VIII, § 4, Constitution of Utah.

6.

Controlled Substance Rules for DOPL (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16).
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Please see attached
VHS Video Tape
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

referee to render decision or enter judgment on
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079.
Referee's failure to file report within time
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation

Rule 54

as terminating reference, 71 A.LR.4th 889.
What are "exceptional conditions* justifying
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1
A.L.R. Fed. 922.

PART VH. JUDGMENT
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and
any order from which an appeal Ues. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and lor involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in
kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided,
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state
of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted
by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs
are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs
taxed by the court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.

Rule 54
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(d)(3) Peleted.]
(d)(4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include
in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the
time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained.
The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained,
in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation
thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (dX3)
and (dX4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See,
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P.
This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b).
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims,
U.R.C.P. 62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78-46-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
—In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Extension of time for filing.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Mediation.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Appealability.
—Attorney's fee award.
—Certification,
—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
—Effect of counterclaim.
—No just reason for delay.
—Review of finality.
—Separate claims.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on impleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty.
Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality.
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Specific performance request.
Statute of limitations.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited.
Absence of express determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan

agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and counterclaim would be
subject, on remand, to revision since all claims
presented had not been adjudicated and since
trial court made no express determination as
required by this section. M & S Constr. & Eng'g
Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139,
467 P.2d 410 (1970).
Amendment of pleadings.
Under Rule 15(b) and Subdivision (c)(1) of
this rule, amendments should be allowed if a
case has actually been tried on a different issue
or a different theory than had been pleaded.
First Sec. Bank v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d
859 (Utah 1979).
Appeal as of right.
Where the requirements of this rule concerning appeal of orders in multi-party or multiclaim actions are satisfied, the parties are entitled to appeal such orders as a matter of right,
and the Supreme Court does not have discretion to refuse to review the orders. Pate v.
Marathon Steel Co., 692 R2d 765 (Utah 1984).
After a party or parties have availed themselves of the provisions of Subdivision (b), allowing an entry of judgment on "fewer than all
of the claims or parties," an appeal may be had
on the adjudicated claims or by those parties.
All Weather Insulation, Inc., v. Amiron Dev.
Corp., 702 P;2d 1176 (Utah 1985).
Certification not determinative.
This rule does not necessarily mean there is a
final judgment merely because the court's order
so recites; there was in fact no final judgment
where the trial court denied defendant's motion
to dismiss, thus leaving the parties in court,
then entered an order that the denial was a
final judgment. Little v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918
(Utah 1979).

171

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Costs.
—In general.
Costs were not recoverable at common law
and are therefore generally allowable only in
the amounts and in the manner provided by
statute. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771
(Utah 1980).
"Costs," as used in Subdivision (dXD, means
those fees which are required to be paid to the
court and to witnesses, and which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
Subdivision (dX2) provides a process of review by a trial court of the amount claimed to
be a party's costs, not a process for appeal of the
award. State ex rel. State Dep't of Social Servs.
v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
—Challenge of award.
If a memorandum of costs is filed before
judgment and costs in specific amounts are
awarded in that judgment, then a party dissatisfied with those costs may have the right of
moving to alter or amend the costs in the
judgment under Rule 59(a)(3), enjoying thereby
the time period often days to do so rather than
the more restricted period of seven days under
Subdivision (dX2) of this rule. Nelson v.
Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
Because a challenge to the amount of litigation expenses awarded is similar to a challenge
to the amount of attorney fees awarded or the
amount of costs awarded under Utah R. Civ. P.
54(d), the court reviews such awards under an
abuse of discretion standard. Campbell v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 432
Utah Adv. Rep. 44, — P.3d —, cert, granted, —
U.S. —, 122 S. Ct. 2326, 153 L. Ed. 2d 158
(2002).
—Depositions.
Where depositions were taken but witnesses
then testified at trial, costs of the depositions
were not properly includable within the cost
bill.'Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d
245 (1955).
Expenses of taking depositions of defendants
and general contractor in materialman's action
under § 14-2-2 were assessable as costs where
necessary to protect plaintiff's rights. Lawson
Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heating Co.,
27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972).
Defendant was not entitled to the cost of
taking depositions where the depositions were
not used at trial and there was no evidence
presented that they were necessarily incurred
for the preparation of defendant's case. Nelson
v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
Costs of depositions are taxable subject to the
limitation that the trial court is persuaded that
they were taken in good faith and, in light of
the circumstances, appeared to be essential for
the development and presentation of the case;
deposition costs should be allowable as necessary and reasonable where the development of
the case is of such a complex nature that
discovery cannot be accomplished through the
less expensive methods of interrogatories, requests for admissions and requests for the
production of documents. Highland Constr. Co.
v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).

Rule 54

The party claiming entitlement to the costs of
depositions has the burden of demonstrating
that the depositions were reasonably necessary; determining whether that burden is met
is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd.,
753 R2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Trial court's conclusory statement that deposition costs were "reasonable and necessary"
was not sufficient to allow determination on
appeal of the basis for the court's determination; therefore the issue was remanded to the
trial court to determine whether the costs were
"necessary and reasonable" to the development
of defendant's case and, if so, to state the basis
for its decision to include the deposition costs in
its award of costs. Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d
1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
—Discretionary.
Subdivision (d) leaves the question of costs
somewhat in the discretion of the courts. Hull v.
Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245 (1955).
The trial court can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs, but
has a duty to guard against any excesses or
abuses in the taxing thereof. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980); Hatanaka v.
Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
In modification of divorce decrees under the
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, the
question of the ability or inability of a party to
pay costs is a factual matter that lies in the
discretion of the trial court. Hardy v. Hardy, 776
P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Trial court had discretion to award deposition and photocopying costs even though such
costs were not provided for in this rule, as doing
so was consistent with the terms of the disputed contract. Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App
404, 38 P.3d 1001.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
In a habeas corpus proceeding by parents
against a child-placement agency to obtain custody of a child, expense items incurred by the
agency in the taking of depositions and securing certified copies of a marriage license and
divorce decree in preparing for the action appeared to be reasonable and incurred in good
faith, and these costs should have been allowed
to the prevailing agency as a matter of course.
Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 2d 235,
364 P.2d 1029 (1961), overruled on other
grounds, Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 R2d
199 (Utah 1984).
The trial court did not err in not awarding
the <x>sts incurred by a wife in a divorce action
who, after the suit was filed, secured the services of an appraiser who was able to testify at
length about his opinion of the identity, nature
and net value of the marital estate after his
inspection of various property and documents.
His research and preparation, although essential to the presentation of the case, could not be
considered a "cost." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 R2d
952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Extension of time for filing.
Where, in spite of diligent efforts, a party did
not learn of the entry of judgment until more
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than five days after it was entered, an extension of time for filing a motion for costs was
warranted. Board of Comm'rs of State Bar v.
Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997).
—Failure to object.
Defendant waived any error as to the costs
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited
23 days after filing of cost bill before filing any
objection. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d
847 (Utah 1978).
—Liability of state.
The general terms of a statute giving costs to
the prevailing party do not include the state.
Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 R2d 393
(1954).
The state is not liable for costs unless there is
some statute or rule of court which expressly or
by clear implication includes it. Section 7827-13 does not authorize the taxation of costs
against the state but only provides the source
from which such costs shall be paid when
authorized. Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213,
265 P.2d 393 (1954).
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Chapter 45a of
Title 78, makes no provision for an award of
costs against the state. State ex rel. State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
A fire protection district is not an agency of
the state and, therefore, costs may be awarded
against it. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d
616.
—Mediation.
Where the defendant did not convince the
court that the expenses incurred during mediation were unreasonable or were not "necessarily incurred," the court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion in making an award
for such costs. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508.
—Service on adverse party.
This rule requires that only one verified copy
be served and it is to be served to the court;
there is no requirement that the copy served
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380
P.2d 926 (1963).
—Statutory limits.
Award of costs in excess of those expressly
allowed by statute for service of subpoena,
witness fees and preparation of model, photographs and certified copies of documents was
improper even though the costs represented the
actual expenses incurred; fact that Supreme
Court has on occasion approved taxing of expense of depositions as costs should not be
taken as opening the door to other expenses of
the character claimed in the instant case.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of
process expenses are chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute.
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Witness compensation in excess of the statutory schedule is generally inappropriate as a
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cost. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
Although plaintiff filed an unverified memorandum of costs within five days after entry of
judgment, because he did not file a verified
memorandum of costs until after the five-day
period, plaintiff was not entitled to an award of
costs. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York
Term. Whse. Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d 626
(1960).
Plaintiffs who were contractually entitled to
attorney fees, costs, and expenses, and applied
for them five weeks after judgment in their
favor, were not barred from receiving an award
of such fees by Subdivision (dX2) because the
rule does not apply to expenses or attorney fees.
Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d
160 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992).
Failure of defendants to file a verified memorandum of costs within five days of the judgment required that an award of costs be deleted
from the judgment. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).
The requirement that a verified memorandum of costs be filed within five days after the
entry of judgment is mandatory and leaves no
discretion to the court. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT
19, 5 P.3d 616.
—When not demanded.
Fact that plaintiff did not ask for attorney
fees in his complaint did not preclude trial
court from awarding them to him since this rule
indicates that there shall be liberality of procedure to reach result which justice requires.
Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22 Utah 2d 297, 452
P.2d 325 (1969).
District court's award p/v attorney fees in
excess of the fees demanded, in the complaint
and of costs where no costs were demanded was
proper where the proof at trial showed the
party was entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope,
589 R2d 752 (Utah 1978).
Default judgments.
Subdivision (cX2) and Rule 55 prescribes the
procedure to be followed by trial courts in
entering judgments against defaulting parties,
and courts are not at liberty to deviate from
those rules just because one party is in default
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of
the case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193
(Utah 1984).
Effect of partial final judgment.
The entry of a final judgment as to fewer than
all of the parties or claims does not affect the
ability of the district court to proceed with
respect to the remainder of the claims and
parties; and when an appeal is taken from such
a judgment, it only brings before the Supreme
Court that portion of the action with respect to
which the judgment has been entered, and the
rest of the action remains in the trial court and
is not necessarily affected by the appeal. Lane
v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1984).
Final order.
—Appealability.
The final judgment rule, Subdivision (b), ap-
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plies when the trial court orders a separate
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, ()r
third-party claim, and failure to have the ca^e
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
issues and parties before that court, will deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction over *n
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 208
(Utah 1991).
Appeal of an order that was not final atfd
neither certified nor eligible for certificati^
under Subdivision (b) was not properly take£»
and the remedy was dismissal of the appealA. J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d
323 (Utah 1991).
Defendants, who did not seek permission to
file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of tfre
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and wfco
had, because no final judgment had been entered in the cases, alternative avenues under
Rules 54(b) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for bringing their claims befofe
the appellate courts, were not entitled to appeal
as a matter of right. Tyler v. Department of
Human Servs., 874 P2d 119 (Utah 1994).
Judgment as to plaintiff and one defendant
was not final, and thus not appealable, whefe
claims against second defendant remained
pending even though automatic stay for bankruptcy proceeding temporarily protected hi*11
from having to defend the litigation in state
court. Donohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d 776 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).
Where plaintiff had appealed a 1993 trial
court order declaring the summary judgment
against hiim final, but did not file notice of
appeal from the 1995 trial court order certifying the case after a temporary remand, tfte
appeals court still had jurisdiction to hear tfce
case because the trial court clearly intended to
certify the 1993 order under Rule 54(b), but
failed to incorporslt^'its terminology and tfte
temporary remand to remedy its minor technical error resulting in the 1995 order acted as 0&
order nunc pro tunc, relating back to the 1993
order. Don Houston, M.D., Inc. v. IntermouOtain Health Care, Inc., 933 R2d 403 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
Juvenile courts dismissal of a motion to s W
an adjudication of child neglect was not 0&
order or judgment eligible for certification u^der Subdivision (b), and the facts did not authorize treatment of the appeal as a petition for
permission to appeal an interlocutory order
under Utah R. App. P., Rule 5. B.W. v. State, 950
P.2d 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Section 78-31a-19 allows a party to seek
review of any order denying a motion to compel
arbitration, regardless of whether the order is a
final judgment or has otherwise been desigxuated. *& foal Vss tk<fc distort, cavvxi \xssiftT tbi&
rule. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d
572.
Orders and judgments that are not final can
be appealed only if such appeals are statutorily
permissible, if the appellate court grants permission under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, or if the trial court expressly certifies them as final for purposes of
appeal under Subdivision (b) of the this rule.
Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 397 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7.
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—Attorney's fee award.
Because a trial court's initial attorney's fee
determination in a class action was not a final
order, it was subject to revision by the same
judge who entered it until a final judgment was
handed down. Therefore, the law-of-the-case
doctrine was not offended by the trial court's
revision of its earlier order. Plumb v. State, 809
P2d 734 (Utah 1990).
—Certification.
Failure to have an order certified for appeal
under Rule 54(b) deprives appellate courts of
jurisdiction over the appeal. Donohue v.
Mouille, 913 R2d 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In a quiet title action, where the facts supporting the defendant railroad company's claim
of ownership of a parcel of land and the legal
theories supporting its claim did not overlap
but where the separate facts all related to a
single land ownership claim, the Supreme
Court could not certify partial summary judgment under Subdivision (b) because the action
did not involve multiple claims for relief.
Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah
1997).
A court order was properly certified after
summary judgment was granted for all claims
against a deceased's estate and the court made
the required finding that there was no just
reason for delay and expressly ordered the
UT App 245, 988 P.2d 1, cert, denied, 994 P.2d
1271 (Utah 2000).
—Claims for relief.
Where liability has been decided but the
extent of damage remains undetermined, there
is no final order for purposes of appellate' review. This is also the case where the trial
court's order disposes of a request for declaratory and injunctive relief but leaves unresolved
other equitable and legal claims for relief.
Olson v. Salt Lake City Sen. Dist., 724 P.2d 960
(Utah 1986).
—Complete disposal of claim o r party.
An order that does not wholly dispose of a
claim or a party is not "final" and will not be
appealable. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd.
Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Summary judgment that did not dispose of
all claims of all parties in a consolidated case,
and had not been certified as a final judgment
pursuant to Subdivision (b), was not a final
judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
Steck v. Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990);
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 R2d 1185 (Utah Ct.
A w . 199U> cect. dsoisd, %4A P M 516 (JJtah.
1992).
Partial summary judgment granted on one of
plaintiff'8 three alleged causes of action was not
eligible for certification under this rule, because the remaining causes of action in plaintiff's complaint were based upon the same
operative facts as those disposed of by the trial
court's grant of partial summary judgment.
Furniture Distrib. Ctr. v. Miles, 821 P.2d 1165
(Utah 1991).
Because only part of the claims were resolved
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by a trial court's ruling, and the question of the
remedy remained to be determined, the summary judgment ruling failed to dispose completely of either a claim or a party as required
by Subdivision (b) of this rule. American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Gibson, 839 P.2d 797 (Utah 1992).
—Effect of counterclaim.
Because a counterclaim was still pending
before the trial court, a summary judgment
that dismissed each cause of action in the
complaint with prejudice was not a final, appealable order. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.OA. General,
Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 990 P.2d 945.
—No just reason for delay.
Pursuant to the requirement in Subdivision
(b) that the trial court "may direct the entry of
a final judgment ... only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just
reason for delay" and, because this determination by the trial court is subject to judicial
review under an abuse of discretion standard, a
brief explanation should accompany all future
certifications so that the appellate court may
render an informed decision on that question.
Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah
1992).
—Review of finality.
The initial question of whether an order is
eligible for certification under Subdivision (b),
i.e., whether the order is "final," is a question of
law. Therefore, the appellate court will review
the trial court's decision on this point for correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n,
814 P.2d 1099 (1991).
There are three requirements under Subdivision (b) for a party seeking certification of
finality of an order: First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the
action; second, the judgment appealed from
must have been entered on an order that would
be appealable but for the fact that other claims
or parties remain in the action; third, the trial
court, in its discretion, must make a determination that there is no just reason for delaying
the appeal. Donohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d 776
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
—Separate claims.
When the degree of factual overlap between
the issue certified for appeal and the issues
remaining in the trial court is such that separate claims appear to be based on the same
operative facts or on the same operative facts
with minor variations, they are not separate
claims for purposes of Subdivision (b).
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d
1099 (1991); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank,
823 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1992).
To be eligible as an appealable order under
Subdivision (b), the court's ruling must dispose
of a "separate claim." A "separate claim" must
arise from different facts than those underlying
the remaining causes of action. Webb v. Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (1991); Donohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d 776 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Plaintiff's alleged three causes of action, all
of which arose out of the same set of operative
facts, constituted only one "claim" for purposes
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of this rule. Furniture Distrib. Ctr. v. Miles, 821
P.2d 1165 (Utah 1991).
A claim is not separate if a decision on claims
remaining in the trial court would render moot
the issues on appeal. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co.,
826 P2d 137 (Utah 1992).
Pursuant to the requirement of U.R.C.P.
52(a) that the trial court "find the facts specially," in order to facilitate appellate review of
a judgment certified as final under Subdivision
(b) of this rule, the trial court should enter
findings supporting its determination that such
an order is final and the findings should explain
the lack of factual overlap between the certified
and remaining claims. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co.,
826 R2d 137 (Utah 1992).
Inconsistent oral statements.
Oral statements of opinion by the trial court
inconsistent with the findings and conclusions
ultimately rendered do not affect the final judgment. McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241
R2d 468 (1952).
Interest on judgment.
Interest follows a judgment as a matter of
law and is collectible even though the clerk of
court fails to include the same in the judgment
signed by him. Dairy Distribs., Inc. v. Local 976,
Western Conference of Teamsters, 16 Utah 2d
85, 396 P.2d 47 (1964).
In an action on an oral contract, a party's
failure to specifically plead a request for prejudgment interest was of no consequence because the interest issue is injected by law into
every action for the payment of past due money.
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 R2d 301 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
When a judgment is reversed on appeal, the
new judgment subsequently entered by the
trial court may bear interest enly from the date
of entry of that new judgment. Mason v. Western Mtg. Loan Corp., 754 P2d 984 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Judgment based on unpleaded theory.
Where plaintiff alleged only an express contract and he sought no amendment of his pleadings nor offered any proof to establish a quantum meruit theory, court erred in granting
judgment for plaintiff based on the theory of
quantum meruit. Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1
Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 (1953).
Although a complaint may sound in contract,
it is not prejudicial error for a court to allow
recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, where
defendant was not denied a fair opportunity to
meet the change in theory of recovery. PLC
Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n Chips,
Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 R2d 562 (1972).
Complaint for foreclosure of a hen was defective because of the nature of relief sought even
though it did not demand judgment for personal liability on contract and judgment was
granted for such personal liability, since this
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the
relief to which a party is entitled even though it
is not demanded. Motivated Mgt. Intfl v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979).
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the
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corporation where the issues upon which such
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 R2d 733 (Utah 1984).
Judgment in favor of nonparty.
Subdivision (cXD is consistent with the general principle that a trial court may not render
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can
generally make a legally binding adjudication
only between the parties actually joined in the
action. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 R2d 1024 (Utah
1987).
Subdivision (cXD cannot dispense entirely
with the necessity that a claimant make some
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 R2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Judgment creditors who participated as parties in a lien case could not recover in a separate fraudulent conveyance case, where they
had not moved to intervene and were never
parties in the separate case. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 R2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Motion to reconsider.
Although a motion to reconsider is not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Subdivision (b) does allow by implication for the possibility of a judge's changing
his or her mind in cases involving multiple
parties or multiple claims. Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
When summary judgment had been granted
on some issues but a final judgment in the case
had not been entered, the summary judgment
was "subject to revision" under Subdivision (b);
a motion to reconsider WQS a reasonable means
of requesting such a revision and was therefore
permitted. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178
(Utah 1993).
The law of the case doctrine did not preclude
the trial court from revisiting a prior ruling on
a summary judgment motion. Trembly v. Mrs.
Fields Cookies, 884 P2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
It was within the trial court's discretion to
reconsider, under Subdivision (b), its denial of
summary judgment, basing its reconsideration
on cases, decided after the original denial, that
presented the case in a different light because
of factual similarities. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 R2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Pleading in the alternative.
In action by architect against owners for
value of his services, the alternate remedies of
an action on the contract ox in quasi contract
under the theory of quantum meruit could be
pleaded in alternative form and inserted by
amendment late in the proceedings. Parrish v.
Tfchtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 642 (1957).
Presumption of finality.
Subdivision (b) allows courts to readjust prior
rulings in complex cases as subsequent developments in the case might require, unless those
rulings disposed of entire claims or parties and
those rulings were specifically certified as final.
The "law of the case" doctrine nonetheless pro-
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motes a measure of predictability in such cases
by creating a kind of presumption that the
court's prior rulings, even if not certified as
final, were correct and should stand. Salt Lake
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Real party in interest.
Where surety's pleadings in action on bond
stated that it deemed plaintiffs partial assignment of right of action on bond as a breach of
contract releasing its liability, plaintiff had
sufficient notice and surety was entitled to
show that plaintiff was not real party in interest as a result of the assignment even though
this specific defense was not pleaded. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 R2d 899
(1958).
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Where plaintiff's prayer for relief does not
include punitive damages but he adduces the
necessary requirements for such damages at
trial, he can claim punitive damages under
Subdivision (c) without a formal amendment to
the pleadings. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.,
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings. However, although
Subdivision (cXD permits relief on grounds not
pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to
authorize the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984);
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 R2d 117 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d
287 (Utah 1984).
In consonance with Subdivision (cXD, it
would have been proper for the court to have
reformed the contract if a mutual mistake of
fact had been established by clear and convincing evidence even though the issue of mutual
mistake was not raised and such relief was not
demanded by the pleadings. Mabey v. Kay
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 R2d 287 (Utah 1984);
Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956
(Utah 1987).
Subdivision (cXD requires trial courts to be
liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified
by the facts developed at trial, as long as failure
to request a particular form of relief does not
prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of
the case. If there is no prejudice, it is necessary
only that the relief granted be supported by the
evidence and be a permissible form of relief for
the claims litigated. Henderson v. For-Shor Co.,
757 R2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The rule laid down in Mabey v. Kay Peterson
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984), i.e., that
Subdivision (cXD allows a court to reform a
document if a mutual mistake is established,
even if the issue of mutual mistake was not
raised and reformation was not demanded in
the pleadings, also applies when the mistake is
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unilateral and reformation is appropriate.
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1
(Utah 1989).
Specific performance request
In action on real estate contract calling for
paying of purchase price in installments, plaintiff's prayer for specific performance was construed as request for judgment for installments
in arrears and attorneys' fees. Woodard v. Allen,
1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953).
Statute of limitations.
A provision of a divorce decree i^uiring the
defendant to execute and deliver appropriate
instruments to transfer an interest in a corporation to the plaintiff created a judgment in
plaintiff's favor, making her action for enforcement subject to an eight-year statute of limitations. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 1999 UT App
130, 977 P.2d 1226.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Where an issue is raised at trial without
objection by the nonraising party, where both
sides, present evidence on the issue, and where
there is no evidence that the nonraising party
was surprised or misled by the introduction of
the issue, the fact that such issue was not
raised in the pleadings or on a motion to amend
does not vitiate a finding on such issue.
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226,310
P.2d 517 (1957).
Where defendants did not plead subsequent
agreement as an affirmative defense to action
on prior agreement, and although plaintiff objected to evidence on issue of subsequent agreement, when it was overruled, he made no
request for a continuance nor did he make any
representation to the court that he was taken
by surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in
meeting that issue, trial court properly allowed
issue to be raised and properly received contract in evidence. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d
205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963).
Cited in Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 545,236
P.2d 451,26 AJL.R.2d 947 (1951); Leger Constr.,
Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976);
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538
(Utah 1979); South Shores Concession, Inc. v.
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979); Myers v.
Morgan, 626 P.2d 410 (Utah 1981); Bernard v.
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Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Bailey v.
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984);
GMAC v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243 (Utah 1986);
Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986);
Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986);
lebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 735 R2d 1305
(Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986); Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d
614 (Utah 1987); Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631
(Utah 1987); Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1987); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938
(Utah 1987); Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743
p.2d 186 (Utah 1987); McKee v. Williams, 741
f.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Galloway v.
Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1987); Davies v.
Olson, 746 R2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Kathy's Food Stores, Inc. v. Equitable Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 753 P.2d 501 (Utah 1988); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah
1988); OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill, 762 P.2d 1102
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevelopment Agency v.
paskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815
p.2d 234 (Utah 1991); Cornish Town v. Roller,
017 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991); Town of Manila v.
Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991);
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Quinn v. Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., m ?.2dfcofc03tah lSOfty, Watson v. Vfal*on, 837 R2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex
fel. D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah
1992); Ledfors v. Emery County Sen. Dist., 849
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Ong Intl (U.S A ) , Inc. v.
11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993);
Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co., 854 P.2d 1033
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Brumley v. Utah State
l a x Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1994); TS 1
Partnership v. Allred, 877 <B2d 156 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah
Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1997); Arredondo v. Avis
Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29, 24 P.3d 928;
Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT
43,23 P.3d 1043; UTCO Assocs. v. Zimmerman,
2001 UT App 117, 27 P.3d 177, cert, denied, 32
p.3d 249 (Utah 2001); Beaver County v. Qwest,
Inc., 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d 1147; Ault v. Holden,
2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781; Brookside Mobile
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 48
P.3d 968.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexamination?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — The
Hecovery of Attorney "Fees in Utah: A Procedural Primer for Practitioners, 23 J. Contemp.
L. 379 (1997).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review §§ 909, 928; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 11
to 13, 19 to 21, 27 to 43; 46 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 1.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C.J.S.
Judgments § 1.
A.L.R. — Effect on compensation of architect
or building contractor of express provision in
private building contract limiting the cost of

the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Recoverability under property insurance or
insurance against liability for property damage
of insured's expenses to prevent or mitigate
damages, 33 A.L.Tt.3d 1262.
Dismissal of plaintiff's action as entitling
defendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66
AL.R.3d 1087.
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing
party" for purposes of awarding costs where
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66
AL.R.3d 1115.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon
applicant's payment of costs or expenses incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.
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Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Allocation of defense costs between primary
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th
107.
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or
other sanctions against attorney who fails to
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29
AX.R.4th 160.
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.

Rule 55

Obduracy as basis for state-court award of
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Attorney's personal liability for expenses in*
curred in relation to services for client, 66
A.L.R.4th 256.
Modern status of state court rules governing
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80
A.L.R.4th 707.
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. Fed.
168.
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514.

Rule 55. Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and
that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter
judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1);
and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum
that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter
judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and
proper.
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a
third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim.
In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by
default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; November 1, 2002.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amendment deleted former Subdivision (a)(2), relating to notice to a party in default; in Subdivision (bXD, substituted "amount claimed" for
"amount due" and "served pursuant to Rule

4(dXl)" for "served otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state";
and made related and stylistic changes,
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 55, F.R.C.R

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Damages.
Divorce action.
Entry of default not warranted.
Failure to plead.

Judgment.
—Conduct of counsel.
—Default entry necessary.
—Failure to follow rule.

Appendix 5

Art. V m , § 4

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

are presumed to be proper unless there is no
substantial evidence to sustain them. Schad v.
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 496 P.2d 263 (1972);
Wilson v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 368, 496 P.2d
711 (1972); Leggroan v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d
403, 497 P.2d 17 (1972); Zumbrunnen v.
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34 (1972).

Legislative enlargement or abridgement of
powers.
The powers given court by this provision
cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature. State ex rel. Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah
93, 104 P. 760 (1908).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Courts *=> 248.

Journal of Contemporary Law. — Judicial Socialization: An Empirical Study, 11 J.
Contemp. L. 423 (1985).

Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used
in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission
to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law.
History: C o n s t 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Former Article VHI
contained no comparable provisions.

Cross-References. •— Supreme Court rulemaking process, Rule 11-101, Code of Judicial
Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Judge pro tempore.
Regulation of judicial conduct.
Regulation of practice of law.
Cited.
J u d g e p r o tempore.
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear
and decide a divorce action does not violate the
provisions of § 30-3-4, since a properly appointed pro tempore judge becomes the equal
in every respect to the regular judge. Harward
v. Harward, 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974).
Circuit judge appointed by state court administrator to serve temporarily as a district
judge pursuant to § 78-3-24 and former
§ 78-4-15 was not a judge pro tempore and was
not subject to the legal restrictions pertaining
to that status. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140
(Utah 1982).

Regulation of judicial c o n d u c t
The Supreme Court is constitutionally obligated to review the Judicial Conduct Commission's proceedings, but the court has no authority to undertake initial review of matters related to compliance with the judicial canons of
ethics. In re Greenwood, 135 Utah Adv. Rep.
27 (1990).
Regulation of practice of law.
This section gives the Supreme Court the
power to govern the practice of law and to discipline bar members. This power necessarily
includes control over the procedures used to
discipline bar members. In re Crandall, 784
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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Art. VIII, § 4

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law ~- Judicial Decisions — Government, 1995 Utah L. Rev. i.

Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law
unconstitutional — Justice unable to participate.]
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Death Qualification and the Right to an Impartial Jury
Under the State Constitution: Capital Jury
Selection in Utah After $tate v. Young, 1995
Utah L. Rev. 365.

A X J L — Disqualification of judge for bias
against counsel for litigant, 54 A.L.R.5th 575.
Laws governing judicial recusal or disqualification in state proceeding as violating federal
or state constitution, 91 A.L.R.5th 437.

Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.]
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons,
907 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1995).

Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.]
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Regulation of appellate practice.
Regulation of practice of law.
Sentencing procedure.
Cited.
Regulation of appellate practice.
This section authorizes the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules, such as Utah R. Crim. P. 26,
that limit appellate review; § 5 of this article
does not restrict that authority to constitutional and statutory provisions. City of Kanab
v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Regulation of practice of law.
Only the Utah Supreme Court has rulemaking power over the practice of law and the
procedures of the Bar. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846
P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992).
Section 78-21-25, prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, does not encroach on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
regulate the practice of law as granted by this
provision, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine found in Utah. Const., Art. V, § I.
Board of Comm'rs of State Bar v. Petersen, 937
R2d 1263 (Utah 1997).

Because the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters, a
trial court correctly determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to vacate an order of
the Supreme Court disbarring an attorney.
Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335 (Utah 1997).
Sentencing procedure.
Section 76-3-207 does not violate this constitutional provision, although it was passed with
less than two-thirds majority vote, since the
statute was enacted twelve years before this
provision was added to the constitution. State v.
Carter, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995).
Cited in Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990); Barnard v. Utah
State Bar, 804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991); State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), cert, denied,
982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); Bailey v, Utah State
Bar, 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993); Petersen v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148 (Utah
1995); In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996);
A.B. v. State, 936 P.2d 1091 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997);
Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 44 P.3d
734.

Art. VIII, § 5

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. —- Court Rulemaking in rial Derisions — Government, 1995 Utah L.
Utah Following the 1985 Revision of the Utah Rev. 1.
Constitution, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 153.
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part HI,
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683.

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal,]
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
In general.
Appeal from justice court.
Educational institution proceedings.
Right to appeal.
I
,
i L T u r p o s e behind this section is to prevent
the chminkeffect on the constitutional right to
appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might be
able to demonstrate reversible error in his
conviction. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah
1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1036, 112 S. Ct.
883 116 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1992).
This section does not create a constitutional
right to judicial review of all state or local
administrative agency rulings; where there is
no specific, statutorily prescribed method for
judicial review of an agency action, review is
available by extraordinary writ. Department of
Envtl. Quality v. Golden Gardens Water Co.,
2001 UT ADD 173 27 P3d 579

limitation was imposed only by rule and not
concurrently by statute. City of Kanab v.
Guskey, 965 R2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

Educational institution proceedings.
District court correctly determined it did not
have jurisdiction under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) to review college
parkmg committee s decision upholding fine for
f a
^ to h a ™ disabled placard visible while
P " * * ™ a J * ^ ^ S ^ z o n e - ^ P l a m T l™'
* ^ of § 63-46b-l(2Xd) exempts from UAPA
actions relating to student discipline in any
educational institution and nothing in this sec^ o n IP v e s district courts appellate jurisdiction
over 8uch
decisions. Wisden v. Dixie College
Parking Comm., 935 R2d 550 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
,
R. , . .
J*. . , / *i '. . . , - , . x
.™» n * h t «f • " m m a ! defendant to pursue a
**?*?*»*
" * *"»*??*? «n»bt»t'*»I
right, but a defendant who tiled an appeal, then
personally requested that it be withdrawn, only
Appeal from justice court.
to later file a petition seeking extraordinary
Utah R. Crim. P. 26, limiting appellate re- relief, bore the burden of proving a constituview of cases originating in the justice courts, tional violation since the prior judgment cardoes not offend this section and effectively ried a presumption of validity, Bruner v.
limited review during the period when the Carver, 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1996).

Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate
approval.]
(1) When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the governor shall fill the
vacancy by appointment from a Ust of at least three nominees certified to the
governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having authority over the
vacancy. The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the
Ust of nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy within the time
prescribed, the chief justice of the Supreme Court shall within 20 days make
the appointment from the Ust of nominees.
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures. No member of the Legislature may serve as
a member of, nor may the Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial
Nominating Commission.
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision on each judicial
appointment within 60 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session for the purpose of
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R15G-37-5

yj>) The dutiea and reaponaibilities of the committee
gy include:
£(D renew report* and other written materials
tie to the committee with respect to nurses on

R15647-1. Title.
These rules shall be known as the "Controlled Substance Rules of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing."

meet with nurses on probation to determine
progress and compliance with any probationary

R1S6-37-2. Authority.
(1) The Executive Director of the Department of
Commerce has delegated to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing all of the Department's duties, responsibilities and authority as provided in Title 58, Chapter 37.
(2) These rules are promulgated in accordance with
the provisions of Title 56, Chapters 1 and 37.

~ Gii) report to the division and board any informs~ i which may indicate that a nurse is not in complii with the terms and conditions of probation, or in
Tjmr other way a threat to the public interest in the
practice of nursing; and
j£\ (hr) advise the division and board with respect to
srany applicants for a license who may be considered
r for licensure under terms of probation or restriction.
^ - ( 5 ) Psychiatric Mental Health Nurse Specialist
* Peer Review Committee.
" (a) There is hereby created a Psychiatric Mental
- Health Nurse Specialist Peer Review Committee
:. which ia advisory to the board which shall be made
ap of five nurses currently licensed MM a Advanced
Practice Registered Nurses • Psychiatric Mental
Health Nurse as follows and the Executive Administrator of the Board of Nursing as an ex-officio member
(0 two educators/adminiatrators; and
Cii) three advanced practice registered nurses-psychiatric mental health nurse specialist.
(b) The chairperson of the committee may act as a
representative of the committee to the Prescriptive
Practice Board, but may not be a member of the Preemptive Practice Board.
(c) The duties and responsibilities of the committee
may include:
U) review applications for licensure and make appropriate recommendations to the Board of Nursing
and division; and
(ii) review applications for prescriptive authority
and make appropriate recommendations to the Prescriptive Practice Board and division.
1993
58-1-6(1), 58-1.6X1), 58-31-4

R156-37. Controlled Substances Rules
of the Division of Occupational and
Professional licensing.
R15M7-L Title.
H1S6-37-2. Authority.
£156-37-3. Purpose.
R156-37-4. Definitions,
eU56-37-6. Licensing.
&156-37-6. Application for License.
R156-37-7. Waiver of License.
&156-37-8. Access to Records, Facilities and Inventory.
R156-37-9. Grounds for Revocation or Denial.
IU56-37-10. Records.
R156-37-11. Restrictions Upon the Prescription. Dispensing and Administration of Controlled Substances.
R156-37-12. Emergency Verbal Prescription of
Schedule II Controlled Substances.
R156-37-13. Disposal of Controlled Substances.
R156-37-U. Surrender of Suspended or Revoked LiR156-37-15. Herbal Products.

R156-37-3. Purpose.
The purpose of these rules is to regulate controlled
substances to prevent their harmful use. Nothing in
these rules is intended to impose any limitations on a
physician or other licensed practitioner to administer
or dispense controlled substances in accordance with
generally accepted medical practice in this state, to
maintain or detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to medical or surgical treatment of conditions
other than addiction, or to administer or prescribe
narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in
which no other course of treatment or care ia possible
or none has been found after reasonable efforts.
R15W7-4. Definitions,
(1) All definitions set forth in Title 53, Chapters 1,
17 and 37 shall apply to these rules.
(2) The following additional definitions shall apply
to these rules:
(a) "DEA" means the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice;
(b) "Schedule II Controlled Stimulant" means any
material, compound, mixture, or preparation listed in
Subsection 56-37-4(2XbXiiD.
R15647-6. licensing.
(1) Consistent with provisions of law, the division
may issue a controlled sohstsnre license to manufacture, produce, distribute, dispense, prescribe, obtain,
administer, analyze, or conduct research with controlled substances in Schedules III. HI, IV, and/or V
to qualified persons. Licensee shall be issued to qualified persons in the following categories:
(a) pharmacist;
(b) optometrist;
(c) podiatrist;
(d) dentist;
(e) osteopathic physician;
(f) physician and surgeon;
(g) physician assistant;
(h) veterinarian;
(i) nurse practitioner,
(j) naturopath;
(k) pharmaceutical researcher;
(i) drug outlets located in the state of Utah licensed
as a:
(i) retail pharmacy;
(ii) hospital pharmacy;
(iii) institutional pharmacy;
(iv) pharmaceutical manufocturer,
(v) pharmaceutical wholesaler/distributor;
(vi) branch pharmacy;
(vii) nuclear pharmacy; or
(viii) veterinary pharmaceutical outlet;
(m) pharmaceutical dog trainer
(n) pharmaceutical teaching organisation;
(o) analytical laboratory;
(p) state or local agency performing animal euthanasia; and

R156-37-6

COMMERCE

(q) Utah Department of Correction! for the conduct
of execution by the administration of lethal injection
under its statutory authority and in accordance with
its policies and procedures.
(2) A license may be restricted to the extent determined by the division, in collaboration with appropriate licensing boards, that such restriction is necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare, or
the welfare of the licensee. A person receiving such a
restricted license shall manufacture, produce, obtain,
distribute, dispense, prescribe, administer, analyze,
or conduct research with controlled substances only
to the extent of the terms and conditions under which
the restricted license is issued by the division.
(3) The division shall not issue a controlled substance license to any person upon a finding that the
issuance of a license would endanger the public
health, safety or welfare.
R156-374. Application for License.
(1) An applicant for a controlled substance license
shall submit an application form in content as approved and tarnished by the division, and shall pay
the required fee as established by the division under
the provisions of Subsection 63-39-3(2).
(2) Any person seeking a controlled substance license based upon their qualification toted under
R156-37-5 shall be currently licensed by the state in
the appropriate professional license classification and
shall maintain that license classification as current
at all times while holding a controlled substance license issued by the state.
(3) Upon receiving an application for a controlled
substance license from a qualified person, the division may issue the license or may assign the application to a qualified and appropriate licensing board for
review and recommendation to the division with respect to issuance of a license.
(4) The division or the reviewing board may requestfromthe applicant all information which is reasonable and necessary to permit an evaluation of the
applicant's qualifications and the public interest in
the issuance of a controlled substance license to the
applicant The division shall have the right to conduct site inspections, review research protocol, conduct interviews with persons knowledgeable about
the applicant, and conduct any other investigation
which is reasonable and necessary to determine the
suitability of the applicant to receive a controlled
substance license.
(5) The division shall not issue a controlled substance license to any person upon a finding by the
division that the issuance of the license enabling the
applicant to engage in authorised activities with controlled substances would or could reasonably be expected U>pc*MthnMtu>tb*pub)icb*M}th,3Mf0tr, or
welfare.
(6) The division may require an applicant to pass
an examination on the subject of controlled substance
laws.
R156-37-7. Waiver of License.
(1) Individuals employed by an agency of the State
or any of its political subdivision, who are specifically
authorized in writing by the state agency or the political subdivision to possess specified controlled substances in specified reasonable and necessary quantities for the purpose of euthanasia upon animals, shall
be exemptfromhaving a controlled substance license
if the agency or jurisdiction employing that individual has obtained a controlled substance license, s
DEA registration number, and uses the controlled

3*3

substances according to s written protocol in perform-:
ing animal euthanaaia
(2) Law enforcement agencies and their sworn personnel are exemptfromthe licensing requirements of j
the Controlled Substance Act to the extent their offi-i
cial duties require them to possess controlled tuM
stances; they act within the scope of their enforce^ 1
ment responsibilities; they mainuin accurate record*"1
of controlled substances which come into their possesm<
sion; and they maintain an effective audit trail. Nothing herein shall authorise law enforcement personnel \
to purchase or possess controlled substances for ad-;
ministration to animals unless such purchase or poe-1
session is in accordance with a duly issued controlled '
substance license.
_»
R166-37-& Access to Records, Faculties and IB>~
ventory.
Applicants for licensure and all licensees shall'
make available for inspection, to the extent they
exist, during regular business hours and at other reasonable times in the event of an emergency, their
controlled substance stock or inventory, records required under the Utah Controlled 8nhstancea Act and
those rules or under the Federal controlled substance
laws, and facilities related to activities involving con- .
tmUtd wtrbttsncM
R156-37-9. Grounds for Revocation or Denial.
In addition to the acta and practices enumerated in
Subsection 58-37-6(4Xa) of the Controlled Substances
Act, the division may deny issuance of a license or
may revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation s
controlled substance license if the applicant or li(1) has prescribed to himself or administered to
himself without prescription issued by another licensed practitioner any Schedule D or HI controlled
substances;
(2) has violated any federal or state law relating to
controlled substances;
(3) prescribed or administered a controlled substance for a condition he is not licensed to treat or is
not competent to treat;
(4) fails to deliver to the division the license certificate upon an action which revokes, suspends or limits
the license;
(5) fails to jwfiwfcafa controls over controlled sub- .
stances which would be considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective against diversion, theft or
shortage of controlled substances;
(6) is unable to account for shortages of controlled
substances in his inventory;
(7) violates restrictions upon controlled snhstsnnss,
proscriptions and administration as contained in
these rules; and/or
(3) knowingly prescribes, MMM, give* away. <***'
ministers, directly or indirectly, or offers to prescribe,
sell, furnish, give away, or administer any controlled
substance to a drug dependent person, aa defined in
Subsection 58-37-2(14), exceptforlegitimate medical
purposes aa permitted by law.
Rlfit-37.10. Records.
(1) Records of purchase, distribution, dispensing,
prescribing, and administration of controlled substances shall be kept according to state and federal
law. Prescribing.practitioners shall keep accurate
records reflecting the examination, evaluation and
treatment of all patients. Patient medical records
shall accurately reflect the prescription or administration of controlled substances in the treatment of
the patient, the purposeforwhich the controlled tub-

OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
i i« otilittd aad information upon which thediis if baaed. Practitioners shall kotp records
from patient records of oach controlled subLfttace purchased, and with respect to oach controlled
sauhstanfr, ita disposition, whether by administration
ifg any other means, date of disposition, to whom
hjpm. and the quantity given,
g (2) Any licenaee who experience! any ahortafe or
D^haft of controlled enhetencee shall inunediately file
? the appropriaU forms with the Drug Enforcement
: Administration, with a copy to the division directed
£_to the attention of the Investigation Bureau. He shall
^ alto report the incident to the local law enforcement
? agency.
r" .(3) All records required by federal and state laws or
r'rules must be maintained by the licensee for a period
offiveyean. If a licenaee should sell or transfer own*
~ ership of his files in anyway, those files shall be
_. maintained separatelyfromother records of the new

R156-37-11

than medically neceasary and in no ease in quantities
greater than a 30-day supply.
(5) If a practitioner foils to document his intentions
relative to refills of controlled mhstancoa in Schedules m through V on a preemption form, it shall
mean no refills are authorised. No refill is permitted
on a prescription for a Schedule II controlled sub(6) Refills of controlled substance prescriptions
shall be permitted for the period from the original
date of the prescription as follows:
TABLE
l IV

(7) No refill may be dispensed until such time has
passed since the date of the last dispensing that 30%
of the medication in the previous dispensing should
(4) Prescription records may be maintain*! clec- have been consumed if taken according to the preseriben instruction.
• tronically so long ac
(8) No prescription for a controlled snhstence shall
(a) the original of each prescription, including telephone proscriptions, is maintained in a physical file be leaned or dispensed without specific inetructions
and contains all of the information required by fed- from the preseriber on how and when the drag ia to be
used.
eral and state law; and
(9) Refills after expiration of the original prescrip(b) there is a physical printout of the controlled
substances dispensed each day that details the pre- tion term requires the issuance of a new prescription
scription number, the quantity of each drug dis- by the preecribing practitioner.
(10) Each preecription for a controlled substance
pensed, the preecribing practitioner and the dispensing fhrnrmmamL E«A fhmrmmrimt thmt i« i ^ f i i and
^ the number of refills authorised shall be docuon the printout as having dispensed a controlled sub- mented to the patient records by the pieecrib^
stance shall sign his name to the printout, attesting titioner.
(ID A pnctitiooer shall not prescribe, dispense or
to the accuracy of the data detailed, or shall make adrninistoT a ScftodnUn controlled stit^
appropriate changes and then sign his name.
poses of weight reduction or control.
(6) AH records relating to Schedule II controlled
(12) A practitioner shall not prescribe or administer
substances received, purchased, administered or dis- a Schedule II controlled stimulant for any purpose
penaed by the practitioner shall be maintained sepa- except:
ratelyfromall other records of the pharmacy or prac(a) the treatment of narcolepsy aa confirmed by neutice.
rological evaluation;
(6) All records relating to Schedules ID, IV and V
(b) the treatment of abnormal behavioral syndrome
controlled substances received, purchased, adminis- (attention deficit disorder, hyperkinetic syndrome),
tered or dispensed by the practitioner shall be main- and/or related disorders;
tained separately from all other records of the phar(e) the treatment of drag-induced brain oysrunction;
macy or practice.
(d) the differential diagnostic psychiatric evaluation
of depression;
R1M-37-1L Restrictions Upon the Prescription,
(e) the treatment of depression shown to be refracDispensing and Administration of Controlled tory to other therapeutic modalities, including pharmacologic epproachea, such as tricyclic antidepres(1) A practitioner may prescribe or administer the sants or MAO inhibitors;
Schedule II controlled substance cocaine hydrochlo(0 in the terminal stages of disease, aa adjunctive
ride only aa a topical anesthetic for mucous mem- therapy in the treatment of chronic severe pain or
branes in surgical situations in which it is properly chronic severe pain accompanied by oppression;
indicated and as local anesthetic for the repair of fo(g) the clinical investigation of the effects of such
cial ywd pediatric lacerations when the controlled drugs, in which esse the practitioner shall submit to
snhatsnco is mixed and dispensed by a registered the division a written Investigative protocol for its
pharmacist in the proper formulation and dosage.
review and approval before the investigation has
(2) A practitioner shall not prescribe or administer begun. The investigation shall be conducted in strict
a controlled substance without taking into account compliance with the investigative protocol, and the
the drug's potentialforabuse, the possibility the drug practitioner shall, within sixty days following the
may lead to dependence, the possibility the patient conclusion of the investigation, submit to the division
will obtain the drug for a nontherapeutic use or to a written report detailing the findings and concludistribute to others, and the possibility of sn illicit sions of the investigation; or
' market for the drug.
(h) in treatment of depression associated with medi(3) When writing a prescription for a controlled cal illness after due consideration of other therapeusubstance, each prescription shall contain only one tic modalitiee.
controlled substance per prescription form and no
(13) A practitioner may prescribe, dispense or adother legend drug or prescription item shall be in- minister a Schedule II controlled stimulant when
properly indicated for any purpose listed in paracluded on that form.
(4) A prescription for s Schedule II controlled sub- graph (12) of this rule, provided that all of the follow. stance shall not be written for a quantity greater ing conditions are met
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(a) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule
0 controlled stimulant the practitioner obtain* an
appropriate history and physical examination, and
rules out the existence of any recognized contraindications to the use of the controlled substance to be
utilized;
(b) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or
administer any Schedule II controlled stimulant
when he knows or has reason to believe that a recognized contraindication to its use exists;
(c) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or
administer any Schedule II controlled stimulant in
the treatment of a patient who he knows or should
know is pregnant; and
(d) the practitioner shall not initiate or shall discontinue prescribing, dispensing or administering ail
Schedule II controlled stimulants immediately upon
ascertaining or having reason to believe that the patient has consumed or disposed of any controlled
stimulant other than in compliance with the treating
practitioner's directions.
(14) A prescribing practitioner may prescribe, dispense or administer a Schedule III or IV controlled
substance for purposes of weight reduction in the
treatment of obesity only as an adjunct in accordance
with the FDA. approved labeling for the product, in
a medically supervised program of weight reduction
based on calorie restriction, provided that all of the
following conditions are met:
(a) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule
III or IV controlled substance, the prescribing practitioner determines through review of his own records
of prior treatment, or through review of the records of
prior treatment which another treating prescribing
practitioner or weight-foes program has provided to
the prescribing practitioner, that the patient has
made a substantial good-frith effort to lose weight in
a treatment program utilizing a regimen of weight
reduction based on caloric restriction, nutritional
counseling, behavior modification, and exercise, without the utilization of controlled substances, and that
said treatment has been ineffective;
(b) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule
HI or IV controlled substance, the prescribing practitioner obtains a thorough history, performs a thorough physical examination of the patient, and rules
out the existence of any recognized contxsindications
to the use of the controlled substance to be utilized;
(c) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or
administer any Schedule m or IV controlled substance when he knows or has reason to believe that a
recognized contraindication to its use exists;
-(d) this practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or
administer Schedule III or IV controlled substances
for weight reduction for a period longer man twelve
weeks in any one-year period. The one year period
shall begin counting the first day of.the drug therapy
aa indicated on the preecriber instructions for -use;
(e) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or
administer any Schedule III or IV controlled substance in the treatment of a patient who he knows or
should know is pregnant; and
(f) the practitioner shall not initiate or shall discontinue prescribing, dispensing or administering all
Schedule m or IV controlled substances for weight
reduction immediately upon ascertaining or having
reason to believe:
(i) that the patient has failed to lose weight while
under treatment with a controlled substance or controlled substances over a period of 28 days, which
determination shall be made by a scheduled weighing
of the patient at least every fourteenth day, except

that a patient who has never before received t r ^ H
ment for obesity utilizing any controlled subeta^fl
who foils to loee weight during his first i u c h t £ 9
ment attempt may be treated with a differentSB
trolled substance for an additional fourteen d a j a S
(ii) that the patient has developed tolerance ( a ^ B
creasing contribution of the drug toward fatfcafl
weight loss) to the anorectic effects of the centreing
substance being utilized;
. j^ll
Oil) that the patient has a history of drug abuseiS
shows a propensity for alcohol abuse; or
_J|
(iv) that the patient has consumed or disposed-sq
mt n
any controlled substance other than in « p iijfin
with the prescribing practitioners directions. ~\M
R156-37-12. Emergency Verbal Prescription. Sfj
Schedule II Controlled Substances.
. -'3J
(1) Prescribing practitioners may give a verbal prtn
scription for a Schedule II controlled substance i£ j
(a) the quantity dispensed is only sufficient to coverl
the patientforthe emergency period, not to exceed 72J
hours;
."""J
(b) the prescribing practitioner has rrsmined the:
patient within the past 30 days, the patient is under:
the continuing care of the prescribing practitioner for
a chronic disease or ailment or the prescribing pree-"
titioner is covering for another practitioner and has
knowledge of the patient's condition; snd
(c) a written prescription is delivered to the pharmacist within three working days of the verbal order.
(2) A pharmacist may fill an emergency verbal or
telephonic prescription from a prescribing practitioner for a Schedule II controlled substance ic
(a) the amount does not exceed a 72 hour supply;
and
(b) the filling pharmacist reasonably believes that
the prescribing practitioner is licensed to prescribe
the controlled snhstanfen or makes a reasonable effort to determine that he is Ucensed.
R156-3743. Disposal of Controlled Substances.
(1) Any disposal of controlled substances by licensees shall:
(a) be consistent with the provisions of 1307.21 of
the Code of Federal Regulations; or
(b) require the authorization of the diviaion after
submission to the division (Attention: Chief Investigator) of a detailed listing of the controlled sub-"
stances and the quantity of each. Disposal shall be
conducted in the presence of one of its investigators or
a division authorized agent aa is specifically instructed by the division in its written authorization.
(2) Records of disposal of controlled substances
shall be ***in*mi**A tad made available on request to
the division or its agents for inspectionfora period of
five years.
R156-37-14. Surrender of Suspended or Revoked
' license.
(1) Licenses which have been restricted, suspended
or revoked shall be surrendered to the division within
30 days of the effective date of the order of restriction,
suspension or revocation. Compliance with this section will be a consideration in evaluating applications
for reUcensing.
R1M-37-15. Herbal Products.
The division shall not apply the provisions of the
Controlled Substance Act or these rules in restricting
citizens or practitioners, regardless of their license
status,fromthe sale or use of food or herbal products
that are not scheduled as controlled substances by
State or Federal law.

